(In partnership with the American Ditchley Foundation)
We gathered to consider the future of the Transatlantic community and its underlying assumptions. If it turned out that the old order was in fact dead and a new state of affairs in international relations permanent, what would we be able to salvage from the past in terms of values, policies and alliances and what would have to change? We examined the deep causes of stress to the old order and its consequent vulnerabilities. We explored the strategic choices and trade-offs presented by the world today. This was a civilised discussion that included both defenders of liberal globalism and some challengers. We did not reach agreement, of course, but perhaps did expand understanding.
Secretary Madeleine Albright and former National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley chaired a group that included people within the Trump Administration; proponents of globalisation and multilateral solutions and institutions; those fearful of the impact of immigration and voices from finance and technology.
Almost everyone accepted that the social contract between western governments and citizens was broken, to some degree, and that the international order and norms and values would need to adapt to regain broad support and consensus. There had been insufficient attention to the uneven impacts of globalisation which had led to communities and sections of societies feeling marginalised and ignored. The financial crisis of 2008 had been managed but nonetheless many people had seen no growth in real incomes for over ten years.
Globalists asked themselves difficult questions: “What have we done wrong? What have the populists done right?” Or, put another way: “The problem is not populist success, the problem is our failure.” We had talked of alliances, and the world is split. We had talked of security, but the world is perceived as more dangerous. We had talked of prosperity, but most people, whatever the objective and aggregated statistics, feel poorer. There had been a profound loss of confidence in the liberal world view and authoritarians had been given a boost. Others contested some elements of this. In the UK, for example, the young had voted overwhelmingly for the European Union, although not enough of them had bothered to vote to win the day. Hillary Clinton might not have been the strongest candidate but she had won the popular vote in the US by a country mile. President Trump’s victory represented the structural and geographical divisions in the US.
Internationally, there was consensus that President Putin was playing a weak hand well but not constructively. There was a range of views on how far the West bore responsibility for misplaying the end of the Cold War and Russia’s potential integration into western systems. Nonetheless, there was broad agreement that there was little choice now but to hold firm and to push back against Putin’s attempts to undermine western institutions and western governments through a use of hybrid tools like cyber, social media influence and proxies, as deployed on Ukraine.
There was equal consensus that China was far too big to isolate and that constructive engagement was the only course of action. China had lifted 600 million people out of poverty and this achievement should not be ignored. China had also engaged constructively with international institutions and behaved, at least away from its immediate neighbourhood, as a rule of law and status quo power. Whilst there was widespread evidence of Chinese economic espionage there was no evidence of Chinese interference in western states’ democratic processes. On the other hand, China’s other great achievement had been to split the West, pulling the US away from Europe with two US presidents in a row now fundamentally looking to the Pacific, and with the UK and Europe adopting mercantilist policies in search of exports and investment.
In Europe there was hope for a “Deus Ex Merkel” solution (now looking distinctly less likely), where in a grand bargain Chancellor Merkel would unleash some of the economically regenerative power of Germany’s 8 percent budgetary surplus, while President Macron would make this politically possible by taking serious steps on economic reform in France, in order to reassure German voters that they were not funding a profligate and lazy Latin South. Hopes of Macron were invoked more often than a magician’s Abracadabra. Everything in Europe seemed to link back to his injection of optimism, rejection of hate and reassertion of western values. There was a lot riding on his reinvention of French politics. Success would mean a powerful model for European states to combine economic revival with democratic renaissance. Failure could open the door to the far right wider than ever, with the traditional parties all but destroyed and the field open.
One of the recurrent themes of the conference was the tension between direct and representative democracy. People asked if direct democracy – the immediacy of social media as well as the blunt tools of referendums – could deliver statesmen and women as opposed to just deft politicians and celebrity figures. Representative democracy relied on institutions to moderate or dampen knee jerk reactions. There was talk of institutions needing to protect liberalism from democracy – hardly a new thought in the corridors of power but also one of the habits of political elites that has most fuelled the current rejection of mainstream politics.
Whereas a return to more isolationist policies might in fact be possible economically, politically and geographically for the United States and Canada as a North American unit, this did not look viable in any way for Europe, with its unmanageable land and sea borders 14km from Africa and separated only from the turbulent Middle East by a hard-pressed Turkey going through its own crisis of identity. Equally, Europe needed to be open to the world for controlled immigration, trade and finance, in order to manage the economic impact of its ageing population.
The question of migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe and the extent to which we were already in a clash of civilisations as a result was one of the most contested aspects of the debate. France faced a severe terrorist threat. 90 percent of migrants were Muslim. There were increasing problems of integration which were fuelling the rise of the far right. If the centre was too complacent then the far right would win across Europe. It was too early to say that the populist tide had been turned when the National Front had received 35 percent of the vote in France and similarly strong support in the Netherlands and Austria.
With poor growth and minimal income increases across much of the developed world in the last ten years, whilst the elite’s wealth had grown sharply, it was not surprising that business was seen as the enemy by many citizens (what is surprising of course is the election of a businessman to address the problem). The banks remained suspect because of their role in the 2008 crisis but the winds of resentment were now blowing against the major technology companies who were increasingly seen as rich and complacent incumbents rather than as levelling challengers of the status quo. This was particularly the case in Europe, with the determination that the US technology companies should be forced to pay appropriate taxes. The companies were increasingly described in political circles in Europe as capturing European innovation, rather than stimulating it, using their large untaxed profits to buy any promising start ups.
There was naturally no consensus on solutions given the range of political views present but the prescriptions can be grouped under three headings:
Get Some Perspective, Get Over It
There was a contrarian view in contrast to both the soul searching of disappointed globalists and the Brexit-welcoming nationalists that in fact things are not that bad and that radical solutions or change may not be needed. Brexit might work out in the end but in any case the UK had already absorbed some of the pain through devaluation of the currency. Although there was a lot of sound and fury around the Trump Administration, the markets remained more or less steady and growth was at 3 percent, which was not bad. Europe had been the centre of global instability for hundreds of years but now remained relatively stable, certainly compared to the Balkan wars of the 1990s. The populists in Europe were for the most part still the challengers rather than in power. Although Trump might be a populist, there was actually more continuity than change on many aspects of foreign policy, national security and even economics. The most underrated threat was North Korea, despite everyone worrying about it all the time. We might be missing the boom times but the world was still better than it had ever been and a majority of its people safer and healthier. (Happier is of course a different order question.)
Get the priorities right, “America first”
For neo-nationalist political insurgents, Bush had been a disaster abroad and Obama a disaster at home and abroad. The US had overreached in its response to 9/11 by seeking to impose democracy in the Middle East. This had diverted priorities away from the homeland and embroiled the US in un-winnable wars in Iraq and then Afghanistan costing both blood and treasure. Meanwhile, the European elements in the western alliance had been allowed to wind down defence spending even as Russia re-emerged as an unruly independent actor in Europe and the Middle East rather than integrated into western alliances as had been hoped.
Obama had courted China with his Pacific pivot but this had been interpreted as weakness, it was argued, with a flow of intellectual property and economic opportunity to China, resulting in a big trade surplus. Big strategic challenges like North Korea had been kicked down the road. China would only respect strong words and strong leadership to back it up.
On efforts to deal with terrorism, trying to promote democracy in the Middle East had weakened existing regimes and state borders without delivering a new order, opening the door for the expansion of ISIS. It was time to return to old alliances with friendly autocrats and to accept the world as it really was.
Meanwhile, Europe had been allowed to impose trade regulations if not tariffs that had blocked US exports. It was now time for the US to pursue transactional real politik to deliver more reciprocal trade relations across the Atlantic and the Pacific. At home, America’s prosperity would be renewed by taking regulatory shackles off business and incentivising the wealthy and the middle classes to create yet more wealth and jobs through tax cuts.
This shift was nothing new in American politics, it was claimed. It fitted better the new world that was emerging. It was more realistic about America’s power to change that world. And it would enable the US to protect its homeland better against strategic, terrorist and economic threats, rebuilding power and wealth for the contested times ahead as China stands up to its full height.
Get the Islamists
There was vigorous debate whether religious extremism and terrorism were best countered through a criminal law lens or whether this needed to be seen as a much more existential threat to western democracies that demanded a full spectrum response. From one perspective, prevention demanded the legal framework of the war on terror (for example through pre-emptive drone strikes to stop attacks in planning) but, insofar as possible, the rule of law should be applied and terrorists should be prosecuted as the “murderous, psychopathic thugs” they often were. Terrorists wanted to be viewed as religious warriors and we should not afford them that distinction, de-emphasising the role of Islam, which was often marginal. For others, there was a fundamental clash between the values of the West and the ideology of radical Islam. If we did not accept this and take appropriate measures to harden our borders and strengthen our culture, then we would court future disaster, particularly in Southern Europe which faced mass migration from the Middle East and Africa, with the demographic trends making the latter of particular concern. If responsible politicians remained complacent then irresponsible politicians would take power.
Get back to the programme
The programme is global development, both economic and political. For those advocating these solutions, the developed world and international institutions had made serious mistakes but a constructive attitude to globalisation and multilateral action remained the only viable route back to economic growth, political stability and human progress. The liberal world order had proved surprisingly resilient. It was a time for adaptation, not for destruction.
President Trump’s unilateral actions were being constrained by American institutions and the rule of law but the damage to American prestige and credibility was considerable nonetheless. Nonetheless, uncertainty should not be taken as an excuse for inaction. The Trump moment might pass, either by his replacement or by evolution. In the meantime, we had to generate ideas, try new solutions and develop our own leadership, whether in the US or in Europe. The Trump era could yet surprise in positive as well as negative ways.
More had to be done to smooth the uneven impact of globalisation on communities and to address the inequality in our societies. It was time to rebalance between the interests of employees and capital in order to preserve capitalism’s credibility as a system that in the end benefitted all. There could be a renewed role here for the multilateral institutions of capitalism, the IMF and OECD. China had to be encouraged to be a good player in the international system. Cooperation with China on the developing world could make a huge impact.
Get technology right
No one was certain of the full extent of the transformation and disruption that technology would eventually work on
our economies and societies but everyone was convinced it was happening and that what would be different this time would be the speed of change. Even free market advocates could see the case for industrial policy, for example major investment in infrastructure, to ease the transition for those who would find it difficult to develop the right skills for the new economy. We would need to develop new forms of lifelong education and build the right economic incentives into our welfare systems.
This Note reflects the Director’s personal impressions of the conference. No participant is in any way committed to its content or expression.
Dr Madeleine Albright
Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group; Albright Capital Management; Mortara Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, The Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Formerly: 64th Secretary of State of the United States; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1993-97).
Mr Stephen J. Hadley
Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC (2009-). Formerly: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (2005-09); Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (2001-05); Partner, Shea and Gardner and Principal, The Scowcroft Group (1993-2001).
Professor Wendy Dobson
Professor of Economic Analysis and Policy, and Co-Director, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto (1993-); Chair, Pacific Trade and Development Network. Formerly: Associate Deputy Minister of Finance (1987-89); President, C. D. Howe Institute (1981-87). A Member of the Board of Directors, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Ms Navneet Khinda
Policy Advisor, Office of the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities (2016-). Formerly: Policy Intern, Office of the Prime Minister (2016).
Professor Roland Paris
University Research Chair in International Security and Governance, University of Ottawa. Formerly: Senior Advisor on Global Affairs and Defence to the Prime Minister of Canada; Founder and Director, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa; Policy Advisor, Privy Council (Cabinet) Office, Department of Foreign Affairs, and Federal-Provincial Relations Office; Director of Research, Conference Board of Canada; Expert Advisory Group, NATO.
Ms Joanna Slater
U.S. Correspondent, The Globe & Mail. Formerly: Berlin Correspondent (2014-15) and New York Bureau Chief (2010-14); Staff Writer, The Wall Street Journal (2006-10); India Bureau Chief, Asian Wall Street Journal and Far Eastern Economic Review (2001-04); Senior Writer and Correspondent, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong (1998-2000).
Ambassador David O'Sullivan
Ambassador/Head of Delegation, EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC (2014-). Formerly: Chief Operating Officer, European External Action Service, Brussels (2010-14); Director General for Trade (2005-10); Chief Negotiator for the Doha Development Round; Secretary General, European Commission (2000-2005).
Ambassador Joâo Vale de Almeida
European Union Ambassador to the United Nations (2015-). Formerly: European Union Ambassador to the United States (2010-14); Director General for External Relations, European Commission (2009-10); EU Sherpa for G8 and G20 Summits (2005-10); Head of Cabinet for European Commission President José Manuel Barroso (2004-09); Deputy Chief Spokesman of the European Commission.
Mr Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry
Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, DC (2015-); Contributing Writer, Bloomberg View (2017-); Contributing Writer, America Magazine (2016-); Columnist, National Review Online (2015-).
The Hon. Pierre Lellouche
Partner, PL ILS; elected member, Paris City Council. Formerly: Deputy for Paris (1) (The Republicans), National Assembly (1993-2017); Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry (2010-12); Minister of State for European Affairs (2009-10); Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2009); Special Assistant to the French President for French-Turkish relations (2008); President, NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2004-06); Diplomatic Adviser to the Mayor of Paris; Co-Founder and Principal, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) (1979-88).
Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller
Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC (2014-). Formerly: Senior Transatlantic Fellow (2009-14), Director, Berlin Office (2005-09), German Marshall Fund of the United States; Die Zeit: International Security Editor (1998-2005); Foreign and Security Policy Writer (1994-98). A Governor, The Ditchley Foundation.
Ms Anja Manuel
Co-Founder and Principal, RiceHadleyGates LLC (2009-); Lecturer in International Policy Studies, Stanford University (2009-); board member, Overseas Shipping Group Inc. and Ripple Inc. (2017-); author, 'This Brave New World' (Simon & Schuster); board member, Governor Brown Export Commission (2015-). Formerly: Special Assistant for South Asia to Under-Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (2005-07); Counsel, WilmerHale (2001-05, 2008-09); Investment Banker, Salomon Brothers (1996-97). A member of the Board of Directors of The American Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Michael Dougherty
Senior Writer, National Review; Senior Fellow, Defense Priorities; Founder, media startup, Unreal Media. Formerly: Senior Correspondent, The Week; Politics Editor, Business Insider.
Professor Masha Gessen
Amherst College; author, 'The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia', 'The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin', and other books; contributing opinion writer, The New York Times; contributor: New York Review of Books, Harper's, The New Yorker; Vice-President, PEN America; Guggenheim Fellow (2017). Formerly: Andrew Carnegie Fellow (2015-16).
Dr Javier Solana
President, ESADEgeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, Madrid.
Mr Jorge Toledo CMG
Spanish Diplomatic Service: Secretary of State for European Affairs (2016-). Formerly: Director, Department of EU Affairs and G20, Office of the President of the Government of Spain (2012-16); Ambassador to Senegal (2008-11).
Mr Johan Eliasch
Chairman and CEO, HEAD; Executive Chairman: ECJ Investments; London Films; President, Global Strategy Forum; Founder, Cool Earth; Patron, Stockholm University; Founder, Rainforest Trust. Formerly: Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Deputy Treasurer, Conservative Party (2003-07); Special Advisor to the Leaders of the Opposition and Shadow Foreign Secretaries (1997-2006).
Mr Hüseyin Gün
Managing Partner, Sargun Savunma Sistemleri A.S. (Turkey).
The Lord Aldington
Chairman, Intramuros Ltd; Chairman, 2019 Committee, New College, Oxford. Formerly: Chairman, Deutsche Bank London (2002-09); Vice President, National Churches Trust (2008-16); Trustee, Institute for Philanthropy (2008-14); Trustee, Royal Academy Trust (2003-13); Chairman, Stramongate Ltd (2007-11); Member, Council of the British-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1995-2008). A Governor and Member of the Council of Management and Business Committee and Chairman of the Finance and General Purposes Committee of The Ditchley Foundation.
The Rt Hon. Nick Clegg
Director, Open Reason. Formerly: Deputy Prime Minister of United Kingdom (2010-15); Leader of Liberal Democrats (2007-15); Liberal Democrat Member of Parliament (2005-17); Member of the European Parliament (1999-2004).
Mr Bill Emmott
Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, University of Oxford. Formerly: Editor-in-Chief, The Economist (1993-2006). Author, ‘The Fate of the West: The Battle to Save the World's Most Successful Political Idea’ (Profile/Public Affairs, 2017). A Governor of The Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Edward Luce
Financial Times (1995-): Chief U.S. Columnist. Formerly: Washington Bureau Chief (2006-11); South Asia Bureau Chief, New Delhi; Capital Markets Editor; Philippines Correspondent. Author, three books including 'The Retreat of Western Liberalism' (Little, Brown UK, and Grove Atlantic, U.S., 2017), 'Time to Start Thinking: America and the Spectre of Decline' (2012) and 'In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India' (2006).
Dr Christian Turner CMG
Deputy National Security Adviser, The Cabinet Office (2017-). Formerly: Director General, Middle East and North Africa and Acting Director General Political, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (2016-17); Director, London Syria Conference 2016, No.10; British High Commissioner to Kenya (2012-15); Director for the Middle East and North Africa, FCO (2009-12); Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit.
Dr Catherine Wills
Art Historian. A Governor and Member of the Council of Management and Programme Committee, The Ditchley Foundation; A Member of the Board of Directors, The American Ditchley Foundation.
UNITED KINGDOM/UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Lady Judge CBE
National Chairman, UK Institute of Directors (2015-); Chairman, Energy Institute, University College London; Chairman Emeritus, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority; Deputy Chairman, TEPCO Reform Committee and Chairman of its Task Force on Nuclear Safety; Adviser, Statoil (Norway); Director, Magna International (Canada), among others; Chairman, CIFAS (UK fraud protection agency). Formerly: Chairman, UK Pension Protection Fund (2011-16); Director, NV Bekaert SA (Brussels); Executive Director, Samuel Montagu & Co. Ltd; Director, News International; Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. A Governor and a Member of the Programme Committee and Business Committee, The Ditchley Foundation.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Mr Michael Anton
Deputy Assistant to the President for Strategic Communications, National Security Council, The White House (2017-). Formerly: Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (President George W. Bush administration); Deputy Foreign Policy Adviser, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani's 2008 presidential campaign; speechwriter for Rupert Murdoch, Fox News; Managing Director, BlackRock; Director of Executive Communications, Citigroup.
Ms Caroline Atkinson
Head, Global Policy, Google, Inc. Formerly: Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economics, White House; International Monetary Fund; U.S. Treasury Department; Chair, Global Economics Roundtable, Council on Foreign Relations; Senior Manager on Financial Stability and Regulation, Bank of England; journalist, The Washington Post.
Ms Jessica Brandt
Fellow and Special Adviser to the President, Brookings Institution.
The Hon. John O. Brennan
Senior Advisor, Kissinger Associates, Inc. Formerly: Director, CIA (2013-17); Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser (2009-13); Chairman, Intelligence and National Security Alliance (2006-08); interim Director, National Counterterrorism Centre (2004-05); Deputy Executive Director, CIA (2001-03); CIA officer (1980-2005).
Professor Nicholas Burns
Harvard Kennedy School: Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations; Formerly: Member, Secretary of State John Kerry's Foreign Affairs Policy Board, U.S. Department of State; (2014-17); Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State (2005-08); U.S. Ambassador to NATO (2001-05); to Greece (1997-2001); Spokesman, U.S. Department of State (1995-97); Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, Special Assistant to President Clinton and Director for Soviet Affairs in the Administration of President George H.W. Bush, National Security Council (1990-95). Vice Chair, The American Ditchley Foundation.
Professor Tyler Cowen
Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics, George Mason University; Director, Mercatus Center; author: 'The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream', 'Average is Over', 'The Great Stagnation' and others; blogger, www.marginalrevolution.com.
Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder
President, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2013-). Formerly: U.S. Ambassador to NATO (2009-13); Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution (1998-2009); Director for European Affairs, National Security Council (1995-97); Director of Research, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Policy (1990-97); Associate Professor, University of Maryland's School of Public Policy.
Dr Karen Donfried
President, German Marshall Fund of the United States (2014-). Formerly: Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, National Security Council; National Intelligence Officer for Europe, National Intelligence Council; Executive Vice President, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF); Senior Director for Policy Programs, GMF; Europe Portfolio, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State; Director of Foreign Policy, GMF; European Affairs Specialist, Congressional Research Service. Member: Council on Foreign Relations and American Council on Germany.
Professor Daniel Drezner
Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University (2006-); non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; contributing editor, Washington Post. Formerly: Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago (1999-2006); International Economist, Office of International Banking & Securities, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2000-01); Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado (1996-99).
Professor Oona A. Hathaway
Yale University: Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Counselor to the Dean, Yale Law School (2009-); Professor of International Law and Area Studies, MacMillan Center; faculty, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs; Professor, Department of Political Science; member, Provost's Committee on International Affairs. Member, Strategic Initiatives Committee, American Society of International Law; member, Advisory Committee on International Law for the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC (2005-). Formerly: Special Counsel to the General
Counsel for National Security Law at the U.S. Department of Defense (2014-15).
Mr David Ignatius
Associate Editor and Columnist, The Washington Post, Washington, DC; author, twice-weekly, globally distributed column on global politics, economics and international affairs (2003-); Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Formerly: Executive Editor, International Herald Tribune (2000-03); The Washington Post: Assistant Managing Editor for business news (1993-99), Foreign Editor (1990-1992), Editor, Outlook section (1986-90). Wall Street Journal: reporter (1976-85), Chief Diplomatic Correspondent (1984-85), Middle East Correspondent (1980-83); author, including 'Body of Lies' (made into a film directed by Ridley Scott) and 'The Director' (about hacking and espionage).
Mr Cary A. Koplin
Managing Director, Investment Management Division, Neuberger Berman, LLC (2000-). Formerly: Managing Director, Schroder Wertheim & Co. Inc./Wertheim & Co. (1966-2000). President, The American Ditchley Foundation.
Ms Jami Miscik
President and Vice-Chairman, Kissinger Associates Inc. (2009-); Board of Directors: Morgan Stanley, In-Q-Tel, Council on Foreign Relations. Formerly: Member (2009-17) and Co-Chair (2014-17), President's Intelligence Board; Board of Directors, EMC Corporation (2009-16); Global Head of Sovereign Risk, Lehman Brothers (2005-08); Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA (2002-05); Director Intelligence Programs, National Security Council (1995-96). Vice Chair, The American Ditchley Foundation.
Ambassador Victoria Nuland
Senior Counselor, Albright Stonebridge Group; Fellow, Brookings Institution; Senior Advisor, Boston Consulting Group; Professor of Practice, Yale University (2017-). Formerly: U.S. Department of State: Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (2013-17); State Department Spokesperson; Special Envoy for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (2010-11); faculty, National War College; United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2005-08).
Mr David Schwimmer
Partner, Global Head of Metals and Mining, and Head of Market Structure, Goldman, Sachs & Co. (1998-); Board of Directors, Center for a New American Security. Formerly: Co-Chief Executive Officer, Goldman, Sachs Russia/CIS and Head of Investment Banking for Russia and Eastern Europe; Chief of Staff to then-President and Chief Operating Officer Lloyd Blankfein. A member of the Board of Directors of the American Ditchley Foundation.
Ambassador Kristen Silverberg
Managing Director, Institute of International Finance (2013-); Board of Directors, Vorbeck Materials (2009-). Formerly: U.S. Ambassador to the European Union (2008-09); Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (2005-08); Deputy Assistant to the President, The White House (2003-05); Law clerk, Justice Clarence Thomas (OT 99).
The Hon. Strobe Talbott
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, formerly President (2002-17), The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Formerly: Founding Director, The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization (2001-02); Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (1994-2001); Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States (1993-94). Chairman, The American Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President, The Atlantic Council, Washington DC. Formerly: Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, National Security Council (2007-09); Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad; Director for Central, Eastern and Northern European Affairs, National Security Council (2004-06).
Dr Thomas Wright
Senior Fellow in International Order and Strategy and Director, Center for the U.S. and Europe, The Brookings Institution. Author, 'All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power' (YUP 2017).