Conference report (11/1982)
Commentary on the Proceedings by Robert E. Hunter.
December 3-5, 1982
If the Alliance does not come to terms with these problems, it will risk becoming a jalopy bouncing over a bumpy road.
This comment by one conference participant caught the spirit of concern, shared by all, on an expanding range of transatlantic problems — those clustered under the jargon phrase ‘outside-of-area’, meaning Third World areas not covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. That concern was evident in discussions on the shifting nature of power and the US role; on the threats faced by allied states; on allied political, economic, and military responses to events in Third World areas; and on the means the allies should find to work together.
I. SHIFTS IN POWER AND THE US ROLE
A major, underlying theme of the conference centred on the impact of changes in the facts of power, both in the world, generally, and within the alliance, itself — thus posing new challenges for the alliance, with attitudes and responsibilities lagging behind. This diffusion of power is also contributing to the sense within the alliance that interests, themselves, are different - a trend developing since the only major outside-of-area cooperative venture, the Korean War. Indeed, it was averred that the Falklands War had finally laid the ghost of Suez in US-British relations!
At the same time, according to one view, the alliance faces the challenge of separating out a general malaise gripping its members — namely, the greater difficulty of gaining West European sympathy for virtually anything in US foreign policy — for outside- of-area problems: The fact that the United States is concerned with these problems does not make them invalid. There is even some anti-Americanism in Europe, whether a product of the political left, the peace movement, the absence of a viable arms control policy, or of a sense that the United States is either unreliable or incapable of meeting and managing those challenges it takes on. Outside-of-area problems have become a talisman of broader unease, but must not be mistaken for it.
This last point was challenged, however, in terms of a clear interaction between the two developments: Part of the central malaise, it was argued, is precisely about the difficulties of reaching agreement among allies about regions outside the NATO area. A further competing view was that the idea of malaise has been exaggerated, and that we have seen all this before — e.g., core elements of the alliance are not in jeopardy; yet this view was countered by the admonition that, in the fable, the wolf did eventually arrive.
According to the first-named view, the problem is compounded by US economic difficulties, in two ways: both a general turning inward, which is even affecting attitudes towards Europe; and a need for America to set geographic priorities in terms of its defence spending. In the former case, political and economic issues have become intertwined, as with the gas pipeline from Siberia, which related directly to jobs, in Western Europe. In addition, different choices are being made on opposite sides of the Atlantic about the balance between defence and domestic economic and welfare issues — thus depriving the alliance of attitudinal shock absorbers on a wide variety of issues, both inside and outside the Treaty area.
This discussion also introduced worries that the United States would drift towards a stance of global unilateralism, with less time and attention to pay to Europe and to NATO. Indeed, a backdrop to the conference was legislation then pending in the US Congress to place limits on the American military and financial role in NATO. And an almost unspoken assumption was that shifts in global power mean that the United States cannot alone assume burdens for the West beyond the NATO area — however much the definition of those burdens may be in dispute. But would the United States accept European ideas about these problems and grant the Europeans a role in shared management of them?
II. THREATS TO THE WEST
The conference debated, throughout, the nature of threats to Western interests outside-of-area. Indeed, that definition introduced the first real debate of the conference, one that bedevilled discussion and was never completely resolved. Were the participants to look at problems from the perspective of NATO as an institution, or from that of individual states collect¬ed under the banner? The majority view was that the latter is more important, not just because of NATO’s particular institutional problems, but also because discussion repeatedly indicated that some Western interests in far-flung areas cannot be considered collective, relating instead to shifting groups of allies, and sometimes only to a single state. Indeed, the participants mused throughout, what is to be made of the concept itself of Western interests beyond the NATO region? It was noted that there is a tendency of various allies to see their own national interests as collective, even where that view is not widely shared.
Some participants were even uncomfortable with the term ‘interests’ in the conference title, seeing in it a potential confusion with responsibilities and burdens. An effort to bridge the conceptual gap was advanced in the idea that there are three types of threats about which the alliance as a whole should be concerned: those with direct military implications; those involving natural resources, like oil, where Europe could lose; and those involving issues that could divide the allies, for any of a variety of reasons — including differences concerning interests, responsibilities, and burdens.
The Soviet Dimension. This discussion quickly introduced another broad theme that continued to the end of the conference: the extent to which outside-of-area issues should be seen in East-West terms. Indeed, should the allies be concerned just about threats from the Soviet Union, or should they look beyond to other difficulties?
The view was strongly expressed that NATO is fundamentally about the Soviet threat — in the case of the Treaty, itself, centred on the European heartland. As the NATO allies look outward, the Soviet threat should also be the touchstone, because of links to European security and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, with its commitment to collective self-defence. Containing the Soviet Union is indeed indivisible, and cannot be artificially separated into regions. To be sure, one should not argue that the Soviet Union is responsible for all the ills of the world, but it is now involved worldwide, and direct threats to NATO are only one manifestation of that new Soviet posture. The severity of threats to Western interests may vary from one region to another, but the common theme must be recognized and the common question posed: will the allies see Soviet activities, in general, as affecting their well-being? This is the single source of trouble with which NATO should be preoccupied, and indeed there is growing restiveness in the United States about the reluctance of European allies to accept this view and to become involved.
In the conference, this view did not meet with universal approbation, especially from a number of European participants who stressed the internal fragility of some Third World countries because of causes unrelated to the role of the Soviet Union — especially debt burdens, oil price increases, problems of development, the global economic crisis, and competing values. Even events like the Falklands War do not involve the Soviet Union, but nonetheless have real significance for NATO.
In fact, it was argued, there are likely to be real and enduring differences of view within the alliance on this point because of some key factors: Europe is closer to the Soviet Union than is the United States, and must therefore concentrate its efforts there — including a place for detente and acceptance of the divisibility of East-West issues; there is global US-Soviet rivalry, but no European-Soviet rivalry for broader power; and there are risks of overemphasizing the role of the Soviet Union in Third World areas if this would affect issues more germane to Europe, itself. Thus there are real differences on strategic approach, with European reluctance to being co-opted by the United States in the global superpower struggle.
This view was also unsettling to some participants, in terms of the snowballing effect of such European views on central commitments in Europe and — again — on the willingness of the United States to continue bearing the same military and financial burdens in Europe that it does now. In addition, the United States is increasingly being faced with choices with regard to the use of its forces. The West Europeans must be prepared for some diversion of US attention, and perhaps even of forces.
There was an effort - never completed — to bridge these competing views of the Soviet role and collective allied responsibility, through the concept that the Soviets stand to exploit Third World difficulties, even if they do not cause them. What matters is the common commitment of the allies to dealing with the Soviet problem, writ large.
Economic Threats. The conference did agree that some of the most serious global problems, today - if not the most serious, in the view of many participants — lie in the realm of economics. Global debt and trends towards protectionism are particularly threatening to the world economy and hence to allied security. Indeed, it was emphasized that the way the alliance manages its economic problems will have a critical — if not decisive — impact on the way it handles its political problems.
Regional Threats. The conference also surveyed regions of interest to the allies, singly or severally.
By consensus, the area most of concern to the Western allies as a whole is the Middle East, with its festering Arab-Israeli conflict, its heavy concentration of the world’s exportable oil, its proximity — especially on its Eastern side — to the Soviet Union, its unpredictable social, political, and even religious developments, and its locus as a place where nuclear weapons could be introduced some time during the next several years, with unforeseen consequences.
Oil figured prominently in discussion: Indeed, some participants expressed worry that a drop in oil prices could be damaging, if it disrupted planning for alter¬natives and reduced income for exporters like Indonesia, Nigeria, and Mexico. Others expressed skepticism, and reflected more upon the risks of disruptions in oil supplies - particularly from the Middle East - plus the prospect that the current oil glut could not be long- lived, especially since there is the OPEC multiplier: a one percent change in global GNP leads to a six percent change in oil consumption and an 18 percent change in demand for OPEC oil.
With regard to the Persian Gulf, perceptions of the Soviet role were seen as a central question for the alliance — whether differences of view can be said to split primarily along the line of the Atlantic Ocean or are present in each allied country in varying degrees. Disagreement is not trivial: Where these perceptions come to rest helps to determine attitudes towards responses, whether to emphasize steps to contain the Soviet Union or to focus on ways of dealing with regional threats and instabilities in the Persian Gulf. There was no consensus on this point, but were strong views, especially from European participants, that too much emphasis on a military response to Soviet threat could actually exacerbate regional problems — e.g., by providing a lightning rod for local instabilities. There was also some concern that the Soviet threat could materialize in non-military ways — e.g., in a peaceful gaining of influence or even dominance in Iran, thus facing the West with a major strategic defeat, but against which military forces would be useless.
The Middle East was also the focus for most concern about differences in allied interests: Could this region, and divergent ideas about relating to it, pose a serious problem of allied cohesion? Could NATO even overcome its general reluctance to discuss Middle East problems within its formal framework? Is a general consensus possible, when the United States has the key responsibility for negotiating an Arab-Israeli peace, while Europeans have interests but little or no involvement? Themes reflected in these questions recurred for the balance of the conference.
From the beginning of discussion, participants agreed that Southeast Asia is less important for the West — though not to be ignored — as symbolized by the fact that the conference was regularly drawn from discussing this region, as well as Africa and Latin America, by the magnetism of the Middle East. Five factors in the stability of Southeast Asia were considered to be important: internal developments, Vietnamese ambitions, the slowly-rising Soviet interest and involvement in the region, considerable uncertainty and ambivalence in the region about the role of China, and ambivalence of a different cast regarding the future role of Japan. Here, too, nuclear issues were seen to be somewhere vaguely in the region’s future.
By contrast, the view was expressed — and went unchallenged — that Africa is still very much of a backwater, with the West having primarily political and economic interests in the region itself, rather than anything of truly global importance - other than the prospect of future turmoil over a problem styled in terms of South Africa. In general, it was averred, there have been few allied disagreements over policy towards Africa. Indeed, there was success in cooperation among allies during the invasions from Angola into the Shaba Province of Zaire; and the five “Contact Group” powers have achieved a wide measure of unity over the Namibia problem. But a note was introduced early into discussion that a more ideological approach on the part of the United States in recent years could be a cause of difficulty, most proximately over the Cuban role in Angola, but possibly not limited to it. In general, it was argued, the dangers to the West in Africa are more apparent than are the solutions; but even if the West is not responsible for African problems, it cannot be indifferent to what happens there.
Latin America, however, does present problems for the allies in terms of differing views. The Falklands War was a symbol, with the United States caught in the middle between Britain and a policy of working with allies in the region, itself. In this region, some European participants were prepared to argue, there lies risk to the alliance in that current US attitudes about individual countries and regimes are coloured by emotions that must not be equated with broader alliance needs and concern. Discussion of Latin America also brought in most forcefully the question whether the allies should be looking only at security interests outside the NATO region, or at the financial and debt crises, as well.
III. ALLIED RESPONSES TO OUTSIDE-OF-AREA PROBLEMS
Discussion groups and final sessions were divided into three areas to develop further those central themes that carried through the conference. These areas were the political dimension of outside-of-area problems; the economic-aid-arms supply/training dimension; and the dimension of military action.
Politics. In terms of regions, the focus of discussion again centred on the Middle East and southwest Asia, as containing the most immediate risk of military conflict that could directly affect the allies. Two areas are involved: the Persian Gulf and the Arab- Israeli conflict, but they are clearly interrelated.
In terms of what the alliance should actually do with regard to the Persian Gulf, views were expressed that the allies must discuss contingencies thoroughly in advance of trouble; that there must be some division of labour — with Europeans being particularly engaged with economic support of certain countries and in trying to promote stability of individual regimes, as Britain is involved in Oman; that the United States should emphasize off-shore forces that are not too visible; and that — in a second form of division of labour — the European allies must be prepared to fill-in for a recommitment of some American forces from Europe towards the Gulf.
In general, it was understood that the United States’ acceptance of a Gulf commitment is running ahead of European attitudes. There was agreement, as well, that the West would stand to lose if either side won the Iraq-Iran war, but no clear view on how to stop the fighting; and also agreement on the value of European political help in the Gulf — some through arms sales — as well as in places like Lebanon.
This last point introduced the other key problem for the alliance in the Middle East: differences on the conduct of Arab-Israeli diplomacy, as well as on the value of Israel as a strategic asset in wider alliance interests in the region, as US strategic orientation has shifted eastward following the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and growing instability in the Gulf. There ensued a classic transatlantic debate about the ability of the United States to change Israeli policy — an ongoing debate, it was recognized, that has only some¬what abated for the moment because of general European support for the Reagan Plan of September 1982 and revived US understanding of the need to move the peace process forward. Serious tensions in the alliance could arise again if there is no progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, with implications for allied cooperation on problems in the Persian Gulf, as well.
On other regions, debate continued — unresolved — about whether the United States has placed too much emphasis on the Cuban role in Angola in terms of a resolution of the Namibian problem. There was little meeting of the minds on US handling of problems in Central America, or on what can be done to reduce this major irritant in transatlantic relations — but with a sense that the less said in Western Europe, the better. There was agreement that the Europeans could be helpful in meeting alliance interests by helping to support debt-ridden South American countries; and uncertainly about the course of events in southeast Asia, and their impact on Western concerns and possible responses.
In general, it was argued, there is still little European interest in outside-of-area problems — with real complications in US-European relations ahead, as a result — plus significant differences of view on what is important and, even where there is common agreement, on what to do about it.
Economics-Aid-Arms Supply/Training. Basic economic problems were recognized as of critical importance in determining both the degree of alliance difficulty in Third World areas and allied responses. So far, it was argued, the allies have not fully come to grips with the rise in Third World debt. The right institutions are available, but not enough political will to make them work, nor a comprehensive strategy. But, it was debated, which countries should be helped, and how? For example, should debt-ridden countries be singled out for help in terms of where Western interests are most at risk? Should we concentrate on countries like Mexico, at risk of ignoring smaller countries with even poorer prospects? Furthermore, private bankers have pulled back on Third World investments at the very moment when these are needed for global recovery. But can governments dictate to the banks? Some participants thought that that would imply guarantees in the case of default; others believed the problem is so serious as to be worth the risk; still others stressed simply encouraging bankers to make new loans.
Arms sales to Third World countries were discussed at length, with a general sense that the balance for the West between profit and loss, in terms of security, must depend on individual and regional circumstances, although the impact on local economies and military structures must also be taken into account. The Soviet factor in arms sales was also recognized as important. In the absence of serious economic aid, some argued, this is Moscow’s only means to creating dependencies. Thus isn’t it better for the West to be the supplier of arms? Others argued that Soviet arms sales alone do not create dependencies: Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan had all turned Westward.
It was recognized that, although the United States is the primary Western arms seller, it is more concerned about controls than are some European states, for which overseas arms sales are particularly important to domestic industries. Nevertheless, it was argued, the uncontrolled sale of arms can cause problems — e.g., in the Persian Gulf — and thus the allies should seek to impose some controls on them, even if this could not go beyond agreement on types of arms to be limited, as was done successfully with Pakistan. In this context, it was suggested that the US-Soviet conventional arms transfer talks during the late 1970s might have succeeded if European allies had joined them. Within NATO, such controls should be worked out by small groups of allies, within a broader politi¬cal framework for each region — with chances of success likely to vary from region to region. It would also be important to discuss in the alliance those cases where some country other than the United States should take the lead in arms sales and training, in order to reduce American exposure.
The conferees acknowledged that the possible spread of nuclear arms is becoming increasingly serious, but that there is no agreement among the allies on how to prevent it, and - one participant suggested - a need for a new forum in which to discuss this issue.
With regard to economic and technical assistance to Third World countries, the conference agreed that more resources need to be committed, that aid should be more carefully targetted on countries and regions where it can be used effectively, but that a new aid institution is not needed. Local coordination of out¬side agencies would help to reduce the problem of individual developing countries’ being overwhelmed by the sheer number of such agencies. Third World food production should have high priority. And birth control could be the most serious Third World problem, but it is the hardest to tackle.
On the special subject of oil, some participants thought that the time has come to try striking a deal with OPEC on long-range prices. Indeed, OPEC has been appealing for cooperation. But others pointed out both that the different allies have. shied away from cooperation because of their individual interests, and that there are risks for the West in any such deal.
In general, it was agreed that, in the economic area, the Western alliance is in better shape with regard to the Third World than is the Soviet Union; but that failure to resolve critical international economic problems, including those relating to the Third World, would provoke a deepening crisis for the West.
Military. The military discussion stressed the importance of distinguishing, in areas beyond those covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, between situations that involve the Soviet Union and those that do not. The most prevalent view was that Soviet involvement would perforce mean deep alliance concern, because of the implications for the overall East-West balance of military power and the possibility of horizontal escalation — an issue of grave implications not yet faced up to by the Western allies. In such circumstances of Soviet involvement, an allied response would be required, but militarily that would mean only one or a small group of allies; rarely - if ever — would it mean NATO itself, for both European and regional political reasons.
However, most circumstances outside-of-area that require allied military force are unlikely to stem from Soviet actions; indeed, most threats to Western inter¬ests in the Third World would not call for military responses, at all. Yet if the Soviet Union could become involved, or if Western interests could be damaged to the Soviet’s benefit, the alliance as a whole would have to take cognizance of the fact and try to limit the opportunities for such Soviet involvement or benefit.
According to this view, in any circumstance in which there were a prospect of a direct US-Soviet military conflict or a credible threat of such a conflict, it is important to have a US military presence to act as a deterrent. However, some participants questioned whether the current East-West military balance would make American deterrence credible; others vigorously disagreed, citing both the US military buildup since the second year of the Carter Administration and historic Soviet reluctance ever to get into situations entailing risk of direct military engagement with the United States.
Placing allied troops in Third World countries would probably not be feasible in the domestic politics of either the United States or the recipients. Some participants also worried that forces in place could exacerbate local problems, and thus do more harm than good to allied interests. However, the Rapid Deployment Force should be more acceptable at both ends, and it has the advantage of mobility, thus potentially covering more than one Third World contingency. It should be supplemented in the Arabian Sea by British and French ships. Unresolved, however, was the question whether the RDF could substitute for forces in place in terms of deterrence; while some participants argued that such forces in any event could only be a tripwire if the Soviet Union were involved.
Where military action is required in circumstances not involving the Soviet Union directly, the ally whose interests are most directly at stake — and which is best able to act — should take the lead. The other allies should give support where there is a potential for Soviet involvement, or else restrict their objections to private channels.
It was also recognized that the ability of the United States to play the role assigned to it increasingly depends on allied support, which has particular impact on US domestic opinion. In addition, allied support would be required in the NATO area itself to pick up the slack for US forces re-assigned elsewhere. To supplement or replace US involvement, France and Britain are probably best placed.
In terms of regional military responsibilities, it was suggested by some participants that the United States take the lead in Central America — with better allied understanding of shared interests and concerns; that there be greater allied understanding of the strategic importance of the South Atlantic — including naval exercises south of the Tropic of Cancer - although this view was subject to some dispute; that either Britain or France take responsibility in Africa, where appropriate; that a group of allies share responsibility for security against Libya, because of its proximity to Europe and its Soviet connections, perhaps including the creation of a Mediterranean NATO Naval Standing Force; that the alliance as a whole should discuss and coordinate military approaches to the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia, while also strengthening Turkey militarily; and that the United States should retain its forces in the Western Pacific, with no expectation that they could be shifted elsewhere in time of war.
IV. CONSULTATIONS AND COORDINATION AMONG ALLIES
Throughout the conference, there was vigorous debate about the ways in which the Western allies could discuss outside-of-area problems and reach decisions about them.
Participants reviewed what allies have been able to do together outside-of-area — and what that implies for what must now be done. It was argued that the alliance crisis over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the dawn of the decade was the watershed: Before then, the alliance had thought and done little systematically about these remote regions, since then, NATO consultations and communiques have begun to take note of them. There was, however, a minority view that various allies have not done all that badly in working together outside-of-area.
There is no allied treaty covering those areas — indeed, at no point in the conference did anyone suggest that there should be one. Yet it was agreed that the allies need to develop means to build upon what happened after Afghanistan, and to improve the level and intensity of consultations on outside- of-area problems — with only the modalities in dispute.
Much of the ensuing debate related to Soviet involvement in outside-of-area problems. In particular, would any serious erosion of stability in those areas be exploited by the Soviets, thus starting a chain of events that could end in the invoking of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty? If the answer were “yes", it was argued, NATO institutions must, therefore, be involved in discussions and decisions at the take off— even if only one country, such as the United States, were initially engaged, directly — if the allies were also to be there at the landing. This, of course, means burdensharing, as well.
As with the general debate about the Soviet threat, this view was not universally accepted, and was folded into a wider debate centred on whether consultations among allies concerning military action should be based on NATO or be conducted strictly on a bilateral basis. To support the former view, one participant pointed out that any such action could require the use of allied military facilities — e.g., to get to the Persian Gulf; it would entail compensation in NATO for the diversion of allied forces, especially those of the United States; and it would have implications for NATO strategy, especially if there were a risk of either vertical or horizontal escalation from military engagement outside-of-area. In addition, the structuring of forces would also be at issue: e.g., ‘heavy’ versus ‘light’ US divisions for European rather than Persian Gulf use, plus taking advantage of increased mobility. Thus the alliance as a whole would perforce be involved.
According to this view, basic political and military consultation must therefore take place within the North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Committee, although actual military planning could be done in smaller groups. Liaison between these smaller groups and recipient countries should probably be done bilaterally, but there must be reporting back to the main NATO institutions. In addition, it was suggested that allied liaison teams should be attached to the American Rapid Deployment Force.
This basic view about the primacy of NATO institutions was challenged on the ground that the North Atlantic Council is too big and cumbersome to do the job, even of providing political clearance. In particular, it requires unanimity and is not effective in following- up. In addition, a number of allies would in many cases not want to know what is going on, and the attempt to widen the geographic compass of formal allied discussions could spill over onto important European security understandings. The fig leaf of alliance distance-taking is also likely to wear quite thin, with a negative impact in Third World nations. Furthermore, not all allies would really be engaged in all outside-of-area issues. Thus there should be a variable geometry of alliance consultations and efforts, and indeed multiple forums for discussion.
This view was countered in terms of the risks of escalation: if there were difficulties outside-of-area, then all the allies would have to become involved. And, it was argued, there is value in getting as much political understanding as is possible in the North Atlantic Council, even if action must be centred elsewhere.
In general, the conference preferred a division of labour, with the North Atlantic Council and other forums being used for some basic consultations — with a premium on confidentiality — and with planning being done on a much more restricted basis. Talking should, however, start well in advance of potential crises.
Several suggestions were advanced. There could, for example, be high-level strategic direction through periodic summits — including the Seven-Nation Economic Summits; a means found for relating the deliberations of the European Community (with their need for sanctity) to those of NATO; an association with like-minded, non-NATO countries — including, for instance, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan - in discussing particular regions; and the use of more small, informal groups in NATO, like existing four- power discussions or the coordination of NATO ambassadors in Washington during the crisis over the gas pipeline from Siberia.
It was argued, as well, that there would be great merit in coordination among individual allies outside of the NATO framework: This has an honoured past; it reduces the risk of drawing some Third World countries into East-West issues where they would rather not be; and, indeed, many of them would not want to be “dealt with” by NATO at all, because of the risks of being dragged into East-West disputes.
This Ditchley Conference reached few concrete con¬clusions about the conduct of allied relations outside- of-area — concerning either the precise nature of threats, what should be done about them, or by whom. But it did provide valuable insights into a new set of issues and problems that have sprung upon the Western allies, and that will continue to face them for the indefinite future. The Persian Gulf is most immediately at issue — on this there was no debate; but it is unlikely that it will be the last.
In particular, this conference demonstrated that various allies are only just beginning to give serious thought to the ways in which their institutions and practices must change and adapt to new political, economic, and strategic circumstances — and to do so without calling into question existing agreements that underpin Western security in the North Atlantic region, itself. The tasks are formidable; but awareness is now evident. And from awareness can in time come the political will to take action, individually or collectively, in the overall interests of all the Western allies.
Conference Chairman: The Hon. Cyrus R. Vance, Partner, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, law firm New York; Secretary of the Army (1962-63); Deputy Secretary of Defence (1964-67); one of two U.S. Negotiators, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam (1968- 69); Secretary of State (1977-80).
Dr. Peter Polomka, Research Associate, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Visiting Fellow, Depart¬ment of International Relations, Australian National University; Assistant Secretary, Office of National Assessments, Canberra (1978-81).
Mr. J.N.H. Blelloch, Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Policy and Programmes), Ministry of Defence; War Office (1954- 64); Ministry of Defence (1964-82).
Mr. Henry Brandon, Associate Editor and Chief American correspondent, Sunday Times.
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Chalfont, OBE, MC, Chairman, House of Lords All Party Defence Committee. Director: IBM (UK); Lazard Brothers Ltd.; W.S. Atkins International. President, Abington Corporation; Vice-President: European Atlantic Committee', UK Committee for UNICEF. Member: European Advisory Council, IBM; Executive Committee European Movement. Defence Correspondent, The Times (1960-64); Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (1964-70).
Air Chief Marshal Sir David Craig, KCB, OBE, Air Officer Commanding in Chief, RAF Strike Command; Director, Plans and Ops, HQ Far East Command (1970-71); Officer Commanding RAF Akrotiri (1972-73); Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Ops), Minis¬try of Defence (1975-78); Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group, RAF Strike Command (1978-80); Vice Chief of the Air Staff (1980-82).
Admiral Sir James Eberle, GCB, ADC, Commander-in-Chief, Naval Home Command; Assistant Chief of Fleet Support, Ministry of Defence (1972-74); Flag Officer Sea Training (1974-75); Flag Officer Carriers and Amphibious Ships (1975-77); Chief of Fleet Support and Allied C-in-C, Channel and Eastern Atlantic (1979-81).
Mr. A.D.S. Goodall, CMG, Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Office; Deputy Head, Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (1971-73); UK Delegation, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (negotiations), Vienna (1973-75); Head of Western European Department, FCO (1975-79); Minister, British Embassy, Bonn (1979-82).
Mr. Charles Hargrove, Special correspondent for European Affairs, The Times, Paris.
The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP, (Conservative), Mid-Oxon; Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Political Secretary to the Prime Minister (1970-74); Opposition Spokesman on European Affairs (1976-79).
Mr. Robert Jackson, MEP, (Conservative) Upper Thames, European Parliament; Editor: The Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International Relations (1970-74); Chef de Cabinet, President of EEC Economic and Social Committee, Brussels (1976- 78); Special Adviser to Governor of Rhodesia (1979-80).
Sir John Leahy, KCMG, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Counsellor and Head of Chancery, British Embassy, Paris (1973-75); seconded as Under-Secretary, Northern Ireland Office (1975-76); Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FCO (1977-79); Ambassador to South Africa (1979-82).
Sir Clive Rose, GCMG, HM Diplomatic Service (retired); UK Permanent Representative on North Atlantic Council (1979-82); Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington (1969-71); Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (1971-73); Head, British Delegation to Negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (1973-76); Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Office (1976-79).
Lieutenant General Sir Richard Trant, KCB, Commander South East District; Land Force Deputy to Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Northwood during the Falklands Operations; Commander, Land Forces Northern Ireland (1977-79); Director, Army Staff Duties (1979-82).
Mr. David Watt, Director, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford; Joint Editor, Political Quar¬terly; Political Editor, The Financial Times (1968-77).
The Hon. John Crosbie, PC, QC, MP, (Progressive Conservative), St. John’s West; Chief Spokesman for External Affairs for the Progressive Conservative Caucus; Newfoundland Government: Minister of Finance (1972-74); of Fisheries and Intergovernmental Affairs (1974-75); of Mines and Energy (1975-76). Canadian Minister of Finance (1979).
Federal Republic of Germany
Lieutenant General Wolfgang Altenburg, Commanding General, Third Corps; General Inspector designate of the Bundeswehr; formerly Assistant Chief of Staff Policy; Representative to the Military Committee of NATO.
Dr. Hans Schauer, Ministerialdirigent, Auswärtiges Amt; German Embassy, London (1965-70); Kanzleramt (1970-74); German Embassy, Washington (1974-79).
Herr Wolfram von Raven, Editor, Loyal, the German army periodical; writer on security and defence questions for Die Welt and Rheinischer Merkur.
M. Pierre Lellouche, Director of Studies, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI); Columnist, Le Point and Newsweek (International Edition); Consultant to the French Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries; Editor, Defense et Diplomatie (1976-79); Research Fellow, Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherche des Problemes Internationaux (1977-78).
M. Yves Pagniez, Ambassador at Belgrade (1980-82); Assistant Cabinet Director to Minister of Foreign Affairs (1972-73); Harvard University (1973-74); Quai d’Orsay: in charge of Alliance and Disarmament Issues (1975-76); Assistant Political Director (1977-79).
The Hon. Morton I. Abramowitz, On detail to the Rand Corporation; Political Advisor to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (1973-78); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter-America, East Asia and Pacific) (1974-78); Ambassador to Thailand (1978-81).
Mr. Robert Blackwill, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.
Professor Hermann F. Eilts, University Professors’ Program, University of Boston; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1965-70); Diplo¬matic Advisor, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (1970-73); Ambassador to Egypt (1973-79).
Mr. Robert E. Hunter, Senior Fellow in European and Middle Eastern Studies, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies; Professorial Lecturer, Georgetown University; Contributing Editor, Washington Quarterly; Director, West European Affairs, National Security Council (1977-79); Director, Middle East Affairs, National security Council (1979- 81); formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy.
Ms. Flora Lewis, Foreign Affairs Columnist for the New York Times, based in Paris; head of Paris bureau, New York Times (1972-76); European diplomatic correspondent (1976-80).
The Hon. William Luers, Director’s Visitor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. Served in the foreign service in Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and Venezuela; in Washington in the Office of Soviet Affairs. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (1975-77); Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (1977-78); Ambassa¬dor to Venezuela (1978-82).
Mr. Richard Moose, Kuhn Loeb Lehman Bros. Inc., New York; Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (1976-80).
Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr., Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Deputy to Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Department of State (1977-79).
Mr. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy, Department of Defense.
The Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution; a Director, Corning International Corporation; Senior Staff Member, National Security Council, dealing with US-European and East-West Relations (1969-74); Director, Office on Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Department of State (1974-77).
Mr. William Howard Taft, IV, General Counsel, Department of Defense; General Counsel of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1976-77); law firm of Leva, Hawes, Symington, Martin & Oppenheimer (1977-81).
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