18 April 2013 - 20 April 2013

States and markets: where are the boundaries?

Chair: Sir Richard Lambert 

The first real days of a late-arriving spring found us debating where the boundaries now lie between states and markets.  The main question was how far the lines had shifted in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8.  We had a high-level group around the table, with a good mixture of public and private sector backgrounds, to consider this, and a highly experienced Chair to keep us in order. 

Overall we thought that the idea that markets could fix everything was dead, and states were now playing a bigger role than before the crisis. But they had no money, and inadequate skills, and their enhanced role seemed likely to be more temporary than permanent in many areas. It was important to get away from ideological debate and work out how to maximise the complementarity of both. We looked particularly at industrial policy, financial markets, and the international scene.

No-one advocated a return to old-style interventionist industrial policy of picking winners and protecting incumbents. But governments could and should do more than just setting the overall economic context, as convenors, facilitators, catalysts and occasionally small-scale financiers. They needed some kind of vision to do this properly. Their need and ability to act effectively particularly applied to areas where the levels of risk, or the timescale, meant the private sector would not get involved. But governments needed to be careful about their own brand of political short-termism, and to pay more attention to detailed implementation of their schemes.

Success stories such as clusters, apprenticeship schemes, or regional development banks, were not easy to transfer from one country to another, since the context and the culture were usually vital. But lessons could still be learned. We looked at a number of areas where governments could make a difference, with skills perhaps the single most important.

The issue in the financial sector was how far it could fix itself, and how far it needed states to do it in the shape of tighter regulation and supervision. We had no silver bullet, but were wary of both complex over-regulation, and the assumption that somehow all would be well without major change. Governments certainly needed at a minimum to ensure that depositors were protected from speculative banking practices, and that the sector could resume its basic function of channelling funds to the economy. In the compensation area, transparency should be the major part of the answer. We were in favour of a fresh look at the value of development banks, and indeed at the overall international financial architecture, though pessimistic about the chances of the latter happening.

Internationally, states were also playing a greater role now than before 2008. Again we thought this was mostly temporary. Globalisation would remain the key driver of change. But states did have more freedom of choice about policies than was sometimes assumed, as we could see from the variety of national economic models around the world. The race did not always have to be to the bottom because of international competition. The need for international cooperation and dialogue in key areas was more pressing than ever, but global governance was at a low ebb, paradoxically. We saw little chance of this changing in the short run, despite the existence of the G20.

Overall we favoured economic pluralism. States and markets needed each other more than ever in today’s world. The key was how they could be made to work together for universal benefit.

Main Report

How much has changed?

We agreed that, while national sovereignty was overall under significant stress from various directions, the boundaries between states and markets nevertheless shifted regularly, following the vagaries of economic cycles, as well as fashionable theories. There was little doubt in our minds that they had moved significantly again in the wake of a financial crisis starting in 2007 which most thought was both deeper and different in nature from previous crises.  To put it crudely, states were back.  But they were also broke, because of the crisis.  Moreover they often seemed to lack the skills needed to exercise the roles they were called on to play.  So there were clear limits to what they could be expected to do.  There was also a big question mark about whether what we were seeing was a temporary phenomenon, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, or something more lasting. 

We were keen not to fall into the trap of thinking of states and markets as opposing forces, or of believing that one side or the other was right or wrong.  In fact our discussion was notable for the absence of ideological dogma on either side of the argument, no doubt reflecting the un-ideological age in which we are currently living.  Nevertheless the view was voiced strongly by some around the table, and not contested by most, that established opinion in many developed countries had gone too far before the crisis in assuming that markets could be self-organising and self-correcting mechanisms which would naturally lead us to optimal solutions. The crisis had emphatically shown this not to be the case, and governments had consequently had to step in to save the financial systems from meltdown. Of course governments, regulators and supervisors had made mistakes too, but the primary blame had to lie with those in the markets who had been blind to the consequences of what they were doing. 

The question now was what conclusions should be drawn from this analysis.  One interesting issue was whether the crisis had revealed a particular weakness or tendency in financial markets towards instability/excess, if left unchecked, or whether this was true of capitalism more generally.

No-one was suggesting a return to old, discredited theories of state control of the means of production or state planning. Comments immediately after the crisis that market capitalism was now dead had clearly been overblown and wrong.  The vital role markets had to play in allocating resources efficiently and promoting innovation and growth were still fully recognised.  The question was therefore about identifying how states/governments and markets could best work together to overall benefit, and do so in practical ways.  The speed of technological change and the pressures of globalisation had complicated the tasks of governments a good deal, and were not always easy to reconcile with democratic constraints (which was not an argument against democracy, but a statement of fact).

Conference discussion focussed mainly on three key areas:

(i)    Industrial Policies

There was no advocacy of a return to old style interventionism: picking winners, protecting incumbents or dying sectors, and pouring large amounts of good public money after bad (though we should remember there had been some successes too – Airbus, not just British Leyland).  Indeed some suggested that the term “industrial policy” should be avoided precisely to avoid this association -  and also because it tended to reinforce the impression governments often gave that only manufacturing industry really counted.  Equally, we did not think that governments’ role should be confined just to setting the right, positive economic context to encourage productive activity.  Governments were bound to shape markets for good or ill through the various levers at their disposal: regulation, tax policy, competition policy and so on. 

The questions were, therefore, whether this shaping should be underpinned by some kind of strategic vision; and to what extent governments should seek to achieve objectives which markets would not necessarily reach left to themselves.  We thought governments had a crucial part to play in both these areas.  The role of the state should not be as the driving force but as convenor, collaborator, facilitator and catalyst.   The key areas where it could make a difference were helping to create the right “ecosystem” for innovation and growth; addressing high-risk sectors and market failure; and making up for private sector myopia/short termism.

The latter question of long-term thinking consumed a good deal of our discussion.  Not only did some start-ups and some new products need time to develop, which the market left to itself would not necessarily grant them, but industrial policies also needed time to become embedded and effective.  Chopping and changing with every new government, or even worse every new minister, was certainly not a recipe for success.  Public sector myopia, with too much political emphasis on dramatic announcements and/or on unrealistically rapid results, could be just as much of a problem as private sector myopia.  Uncertainty and unpredictability were the last things markets wanted or needed from governments.

Some parts of the market needed state intervention more than others, with energy an example of where states should take a clear view (but often did not), and retail household products an area where the state could and should let the market get on with it. One important role of the state was managing risk by pooling it.

The importance of good implementation of industrial policies was meanwhile usually underestimated.  The right kind of skills and expertise on the part of those administering schemes was essential, and not always there.  Those concerned needed to be “bilingual” i.e. able to speak the language of government and politicians, but also that of entrepreneurs and businessmen.  They had to harness private sector intelligence and interests, rather than trying to push them in particular directions. It was also vital to avoid capture by vested interests or large companies, and to avoid giving the impression that when the state intervened, it was just crony capitalism or another form of rent extraction. Another danger was that industrial policy turned into regional policy by another name.

Could successful policies from one country be transplanted to another?  Here we were sceptical, for the most part.  Their success depended heavily on the particular context of the country concerned, including its economic/industrial/social culture.  The latter varied widely between different countries.  Unless proper allowance was made for these differences, and policies were adapted accordingly, the expected results would not follow.  For example clusters on the Silicon Valley model could not simply be plonked down wherever governments wanted to.  There had to be some helpful conditions, or enterprises, or skills, in place already for a cluster to have a chance of taking off.  Leadership was important too. Nevertheless those in charge of policies of this kind had to be ready for failure.  Most clusters, like most business start-ups, were likely to fail.  This was not a reason for not trying – on the contrary.

Areas where we thought governments could intervene helpfully, and which did not need to cost large amounts of public money (given that most governments were broke), included:-

  •  tax policy
  • competition policy
  • setting the right overall rules for corporate governance
  • procurement (though it could not be asked to do too many things at once)
  • openness (visas, IP regime)
  • promoting and to some extent financing R and D in blue sky areas
  • convening power, e.g. bringing the actors together in a particular sector
  • innovation – promoting investment and technology transfer at vital early moments
  • financing – for risky, early-stage developments, and to fill gaps for potentially healthy businesses where the market was obviously failing (‘patient capital’)
  • skills – this was crucial, through both the mainstream educational system and apprenticeship models (much admiration for the German system, despite doubts about its transferability)

Key overall conditions for success were encouragement of open innovation, and the right culture. Countries where the approach was one of growing businesses for the long-term, rather than in order to sell them quickly and take the profit, seemed more likely to succeed.  This was linked to the fundamental idea of companies having a purpose, beyond just making money for the shareholders.  This notion seemed to have been lost in many cases.  If a company had a clear purpose, its board could then have a stewardship role around it, rather than simply seeing themselves as speaking for shareholders.  Some of the worst evils of financial short-termism could thereby be avoided.

(ii)    The Financial Sector

The difficulty in this area was not so much working out what had gone wrong, but deciding what should now be done to fix the problem, and the balance between government-inspired dictation/regulation and markets fixing themselves. 

A number of factors had come together to create the crisis: the search for yield, with a flood of capital and cheap credit widely available; changes in ownership structures and limitations on liability; incentives to take risks which were not well-understood; and practices which in the end compounded risks, rather than spreading them.

The resulting crisis was both deep and wide, and different from previous crises.  Unwinding it and restoring the financial system to health remained a long process, and at best work in progress.  Trust between banks had still not been restored, because of suspicion of what was hidden in their balance sheets.  Trust between banks and the public was also still notably absent.  Meanwhile too many institutions remained too big to fail, and the right balance between international and national was hard to find.  Banks were “global in life, but national in death”, just as profits seemed to be private but losses public. The resulting moral hazard was still with us.

Getting regulation right for the future was therefore crucial – but also difficult. Over-complicated regulation could be a real problem. There was clear risk of refighting the last war. Some issues were also more about effective supervision and enforcement than the actual regulations.

The crisis had refocused attention on what banks were for.  We thought they were there above all to look after depositors’ funds and to provide finance to the economy.  Their responsibilities to their depositors should take priority over those to their shareholders.  In this sense they should be seen as “regulated utilities”, and treated as such.  This implied that mainstream banks would be significantly less profitable in future, though it did not mean they should be publicly owned.  It also meant that either “ordinary” banking had to be separated from “investment” banking, as Vickers had proposed, at least when the investment part grew bigger than a certain proportion; or the Volcker rule had to be imposed, i.e. no speculative trading with depositors’ funds.  For “ordinary” banks, it also required strong rules on solvency, proportion of equity, and leverage.

This led to a discussion on how much of banks’ current activity was socially useful.  Some thought the proportion of pure speculation in many financial markets was excessive.  Others argued that these activities created highly liquid markets with smaller margins, which benefitted normal economic actors too.  We had no time to go further into this interesting issue.  But we recognised that, if we regulated the banks too hard, we risked pushing more activity into the shadow financing sector, which was still largely unregulated at all.

 We also recognised the need to keep our basic aim firmly in mind: restoring the financial sector to health, so that it could fulfil its vital role in the economy.  Regulating it to make it completely safe and to ensure no future crisis would be pointless if it also stopped the financial sector lending productively.  Similarly, while retribution against those responsible for the crash (virtually none of whom had been sanctioned in any way, or lost any of their financial gains) was tempting, we should not lose sight of the more important game. 

This naturally led us on to the endlessly fascinating subject of compensation.  How far should excessive salaries/bonuses be controlled and did this really matter?  It was certainly important for the restoration of trust between the financial sector and the public. The make-up of compensation packages was important to avoid encouraging excessive risk-taking.  Incentives needed to be aligned with desired outcomes. 

Overall our view was that the market would self-correct in this area over time, up to a point, and indeed was already doing so.  Governments should avoid trying to legislate over pay levels.  But full transparency should be insisted upon, to help keep compensation levels reasonable. Boards and their compensation committees should meanwhile do their jobs properly, as should shareholders, and regulators and supervisors.  Where the latter had concerns, they should not hesitate to be intrusive and even directive.  Meanwhile an essential part of the recovery of the financial sector had to the return of ethics and values.

That still left us with the immediate problem of how banks in developed countries which had suffered badly from the crisis (and not all had, as we were reminded from time to time) could be brought to begin lending to companies again, particularly SMEs.  There was some debate about whether the problem was demand or supply. Most thought it was definitely the latter, whatever the banks themselves claimed.  Of course it was hard for banks to build up their reserves and lend more simultaneously, but that was what was needed.  Various methods to get them to do this were canvassed, inconclusively, ranging from “handbagging” by politicians to changes in taxation policy or accounting standards, altering risk-weighting ratios, or small loan guarantee schemes.  There were also arguments in favour of new institutions such as regional banks closer to their customers, on the German Sparkasse model, or state-owned investment banks in countries where these did not exist already.

What was particularly worrying about our financial discussion was the view, including from the practitioners, that we had still not fixed the underlying problems, and that the risks in the system remained very great.  How could this be, five years on? Did we need to reform the Bretton Woods system much more fundamentally? We saw a strong intellectual case for this but little or no chance of it happening in the foreseeable future.

(iii)    The international scene

The underlying issues here were whether the international boundary between states and markets had shifted significantly since the economic crisis, and how far globalisation was a constraint on states.

The answer to the first question was that states were playing a more influential role on the international economic stage now, but that this was probably more of a temporary response. 

Overall, as we had seen in the more nationally-focussed side of the debate, governments were readier to be more pro-active in intervening, for example through fiscal and monetary policy.  Industrial policies had made a comeback, as development tools. But there were a numbers of dogs which had not barked.  There had been no return to overt protectionism, though there were worrying measures buried in the weeds, for example on national content rules.  State take-overs had been used as a way of rescuing failing banks or companies, but there was no desire to hang on to them longer than absolutely necessary.

On the global front, there was probably a greater demand/need for global governance and proper rules-based systems than ever, but little sign of the necessary action.  While international financial regulation had registered some progress, e.g. through the Financial Stabilization Board, multilateralism on the trade side had been mostly side-lined in favour of regional efforts.  The G20 was the most representative body we had, and had played a vital role at the height of the crisis, but was largely ineffective again now.

We therefore thought that there was significantly more scope for international co-operation and dialogue, not least since the shift of economic power from the traditional developed economies to the so-called emerging markets had been accelerated by the crisis.  This made co-operation more difficult in many areas, since there were more different economic models in play on the part of important state actors, including a number which had made different choices about the role of the state and of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  One issue was the continuing unwillingness of big emerging economies to take leadership roles, since they still had so many internal problems to deal with, not least large-scale poverty.  

We were clear that globalisation was not reversible, which gave particular importance to the question of how far it constrained state actions and policies.  The majority view was that, while there were significant constraints, for example from the increasing mobility of both capital and skilled labour, on the ability to raise revenue and use the taxation system to reduce inequality, these should not be exaggerated.  Governments could still make different choices if they wanted to, and if domestic politics allowed them to do so.  Likewise races to the bottom were a risk, but globalisation also created opportunities for races in the opposite direction, for example through the import of higher international standards and new approaches.  In any case the continuing existence of widely different economic models suggested there was still plenty of scope for policy differentiation and experimentation. 

An issue we worried away at throughout the conference was excessive economic/income inequality, within and between states. This was economically inefficient as well as socially unjust and dangerous. The shift of shares of GDP away from wages and towards profits in economies like the US and UK was very striking. But how far could or should states be intervening to correct such trends? We came to no easy conclusions.

We also kept coming back to SOEs, and the role they played now and would play in the future. On the whole we did not think they would prove an attractive model. Where they were important now, as in China, this was more because of the desire to build major national industrial sectors from scratch than because they were thought of as the right way to organise things in the longer run.


We did not finish up with a neat set of recommendations.  We were clear that the boundaries between states and markets had shifted and would continue to shift, no doubt in unpredictable ways.  The need was for policy-makers, in both public and private sectors, not to waste time in ideological debate, but to find ways to maximise the strengths of both, through intelligent co-operation, and help to minimise the risks.  Economic pluralism was the way forward. We were reasonably optimistic about the prospects for this across much of our economies.  But finance still seemed a highly risky, and largely unreformed, sector.


CHAIR : Sir Richard Lambert 
Senior Independent Adviser, Deutsche Bank; Chancellor, University of Warwick (2008-).  Formerly: Director-General, Confederation of British Industry (2006-11); Member, Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England (2003-06); Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration, commissioned by HM Treasury, Department for Education and Skills and Department for Trade and Industry (2003); Financial Times (1966-2001): Editor (1991-2001).

Mr John McFarlane
Chairman Aviva plc, London (2012-); Non-Executive Director: Westfield Holdings Ltd, Old Oak Holdings Ltd.  Formerly: Chief Executive Officer, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1997-2007); Group Executive Director, Standard Chartered Bank plc (1993-97); Head, Citicorp and Citibank, UK and Ireland (1990-93); Non-Executive Director: Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, The London Stock Exchange; Chairman, Australian Bankers' Association.
Mr Mark Thirlwell 
Director, International Economy Program, and Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney; Visiting Fellow, National Security College, Australian National University.  Formerly: Senior Economist, Export Finance and Insurance Corporation, Sydney; Vice President, Economic Research, J P Morgan; Bank of England.

Dr Mel Cappe OC 
Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto.  Formerly: President, Institute for Research on Public Policy; High Commissioner for Canada to the United Kingdom (2002-06); Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet (1999-2002); Head of the Public Service;  A Member of the Program Advisory Committee, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Lawson A W Hunter 
Counsel, Stikeman Elliott LLP, Ottawa (2008-); Senior Fellow, C.D. Howe Institute.  Formerly: Head, Competition and Foreign Investment Group, Stikeman Elliott LLP (2010-12); Executive Vice-President and Chief Corporate Officer, Bell Canada and BCE Inc. (2003-08); Partner and Head, Competition and Foreign Investment Group, Stikeman Elliott LLP (1993-2003).
Mr William Rice QC 
Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Alberta Securities Commission, Calgary (2005-); Chair, Canadian Securities Administrators (2011-).  Formerly: Securities Lawyer and National Managing Partner, Bennett Jones LLP, Calgary.
Mr Joseph Rotman OC 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Roy-L Capital Corporation, Toronto; Chair, Canada Council for the Arts (2008-); Member, Board of Directors, Canada Gairdner International Awards (2005-); Founder and Member, Board of Directors, Medical and Related Sciences Discovery District (2000-); Chairman, Grand Challenges Canada in Global Health (2009-); Founder and Director, Clairvest Group Inc.  A Member of the Board of Directors, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Wayne Wouters 
Clerk of the Privy Council, Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Public Service, Government of Canada (2009-).  Formerly: Secretary of the Treasury Board (2004-09); Deputy Minister, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada; Deputy Minister of Labour and Chairperson, Canada Employment Insurance Commission (2002-04); Deputy Minister, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (1997-2002).

Professor Stephany Griffith-Jones PhD 

Financial Markets Director, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University.  Formerly: Professorial Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex (2000-07); Senior Official, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the Economic Commission of Latin America; Head, International Finance, Commonwealth Secretariat; Central Bank of Chile.

Mr Edward Bannerman 
Economic Adviser, Cabinet of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Catherine Ashton.  Formerly: Member, Cabinet of Trade Commissioner, Catherine Ashton; Economic and Financial Counsellor, British Embassy, Paris; Head, EU Better Regulation Unit, HM Treasury, London; Team Leader, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (2002-05).

Professor Elie Cohen 
Vice President, High Council on the Public Sector; Professor, Institute for Political Studies; Director of Research, National Scientific Research Council; Member, Board of Directors: EDF énergies nouvelles, Steria, Pages jaunes.  Formerly: Member, Economic Analysis Council, Office of the Prime Minister (1997-2012).
Mr Charles de Croisset
Director, LVMH (2008-); International Adviser, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (2006-); Vice-Chairman, Goldman Sachs Europe (2004-); Member, Inspectorate of Finances, France; Senior Adviser, Bain & Company Consulting; Independent Director, Renault SA (2004-).  Formerly: Director, Thales Avionics Inc. (2004-09); Chief Executive Officer, HSBC France.
Mr Nicolas Dufourcq 
Chief Executive Officer, BPI France, Paris.  Formerly: Chief Financial Officer (2004-12) and Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Capgemini; Head, Central and Southern Europe Region, Capgemini (2003-04); Chairman and CEO, Wanadoo (2000-03); Executive Director, France Telecom (1998-2003).
Mr Jacques Mistral 
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington DC; Special Adviser, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris.  Formerly: Visiting Professor, Harvard Kennedy School (2011-12); Senior Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (2011-12); Head of Economic Studies, IFRI (2007-11); Executive Vice President, AXA Group (1992-2000); Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister (1988-91).

Dr Martin Heipertz 
Private Secretary to State Secretary, Dr Thomas Steffen, Federal Ministry of Finance, Berlin.  Formerly: Deputy Head of Minister's Office, German Federal Ministry of Finance; Researcher, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne; Scientific Expert, Belgian Ministry of Finance and Government of Hessen; Senior Officer to the Board of Directors, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg.

Dr Massimiliano La Marca 
Economic Policy Specialist, Policy Integration Department, International Labour Organisation, Geneva (2010-).  Formerly: Economist, Division on Globalisation and Development Strategies, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Ambassador Richard Boucher 
Deputy Secretary-General, OECD, Paris (2009-).  Formerly: US Diplomatic Service: Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia (2006-09); Spokesman and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; US Ambassador to Cyprus; Consul General in Hong Kong.

Dr Jerome Okolo
Executive Vice Chairman, GeoQinetiq, Abuja; General Secretary, National Think Tank for Nigeria.  Formerly: Director, Convena Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg; Access Investments Limited, London.  New Technologies Entrepreneur, Education Rights Advocate and Civil Society Organiser.

Mr Bao Mingyou 
Chief Representative for Europe, People's Bank of China, London.

Professor Alexander Dynkin 
Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow; Member, Presidential Council for Science, Technology and Education; Full Member, Russian Academy of Science.  Formerly: Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, Russian Federation (1998-99).

The Lord Aldington
Trustee, Institute for Philanthropy (2008-); Vice President, National Churches Trust (2008-); Trustee, Royal Academy Trust (2003-); Chairman, 2019 Committee, New College, Oxford.  Formerly: Chairman, Deutsche Bank London (2002-09); Chairman, Stramongate Ltd (2007-11); A Governor and a Member of the Finance and General Purposes and Business Committees of The Ditchley Foundation.
Mr John Calverley 
Head, Macroeconomic Research, Standard Chartered Bank, Toronto; Consultant to CFA Institute; Formerly: Head of Thematic Research, and Head of North American Research, Standard Chartered Bank; Chief Economist and Strategist, American Express Bank; Council Member, European Money and Finance Forum (1997-2007); Chairman UK Society of Business Economists (2000-03).
Mr Martin Donnelly CMG
Permanent Secretary, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010-).  Formerly: senior posts in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Cabinet Office, Home Office, HM Treasury (1997-2010); Chargé de Mission, Monetary Affairs Bureau, French Treasury (on secondment from HM Treasury) (1995-96); Cabinet of Vice President of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan (1989-93).
Mr Jamie Dundas 
Independent Non-Executive Director, Standard Chartered PLC (2004-); Chairman, Jupiter Fund Management PLC; Non-Executive Director, Francis Crick Institute; Deputy President (former Chairman), Macmillan Cancer Support.  Formerly: Chief Executive, MEPC; Finance Director, Airport Authority Hong Kong; Deputy Head of Banking, Morgan Grenfell.
Mr John Evans 
General Secretary, Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, Paris; Chief Economist, International Trade Union Confederation.  Formerly: Economist, Economic Department, Trades Union Congress; Secretary, International Federation of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees, Geneva and London; Research Officer, European Trade Union Institute.
Alderman John Garbutt JP, BSc (Econ) Hons, FRSA, FRGS, FCSI
HSBC (1991-); Director, Global Head of Corporate Governance, HSBC Global Asset Management (UK) Ltd; Alderman, Walbrook Ward, City of London.  Formerly: Director, Kleinwort Benson Investment Management.
Mr Will Hutton 
Principal, Hertford College, University of Oxford (2011-); Chair, Independent Commission on Fees; Chair, The Big Innovation Centre, The Work Foundation; Columnist, The Observer.  Formerly: Chief Executive, The Work Foundation (2000-08); Editor-in-Chief, The Observer (1996-2000); Producer and Reporter, BBC TV.  A Governor of The Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Russell Jones 
Partner, Llewellyn Consulting, London.  Formerly: Global Head, Fixed Income Strategy, Westpac Institutional Bank; Chief Economist for Asia and Head, Foreign Exchange Research, Lehman Brothers; Chief Economist, Treasury Department, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.
Sir Richard Lambert 
Senior Independent Adviser, Deutsche Bank; Chancellor, University of Warwick (2008-).  Formerly: Director-General, Confederation of British Industry (2006-11); Member, Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England (2003-06); Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration, commissioned by HM Treasury, Department for Education and Skills and Department for Trade and Industry (2003); Financial Times (1966-2001): Editor (1991-2001).
Professor Sir Andrew Likierman
Dean, London Business School; Trustee, Institute for Government; Non-Executive Chairman, National Audit Office.  Formerly: Professor of Management Practice in Accounting, London Business School; Non-Executive Director: Barclays Bank plc; Bank of England, Managing Director, Government Financial Management Directorate; President, Chartered Institute of Management Accountants.
Mr Paul Newman 
Managing Director, ICAP Energy Ltd (1990-); Non-Executive Director, J C Rathbone Associates Ltd (2008-); Council Member, The Prince's Charities (2009-); Freeman of the City of London; Trustee Director, Epilepsy Research UK; Patron, Barts Hospital Appeal; Co-Founder (1993), ICAP Charity Day.  Formerly: Non-Executive Chairman, ICAP Shipping Ltd (2007-11); School Governor, City of Westminster (2001-03); Conservative Party Candidate, UK General Election (2001).
Ms Elizabeth Padmore 
Board Member, Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority; Chairman Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; Director, Prince's Youth Business International; Director, Women for Women International; Formerly: Member, Council and Executive Committee, Chatham House; Partner and Global Director, Policy and Corporate Affairs, Accenture (1995-2006).  A Governor and a Member of the Council of Management, Finance and General Purposes Committee and Business Committee, The Ditchley Foundation.
Sir Martin Smith 
Co-Founder and Partner, Beaumont Partners LLP, Oxford (2009-); Chairman, Worldwide Healthcare Trust (2006-); Chairman, GP Bullhound Ltd (2005-); Formerly: Deputy Chairman, Science Museum (2000-10); Deputy Chairman, New Star Asset Management (2001-09); Founder (2007), Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University; Chairman, English National Opera (2000-05); Founder and Chairman, Phoenix Securities (1983-2000).
Ms Sonia Sodha 
Head of Policy and Strategy, Dartington Social Research Unit (2012-).  Formerly: Senior Policy Adviser, Office of the Leader of the Opposition; Head of the Capabilities Programme, Demos; Research Fellow, Institute for Public Policy Research.
Dr Adrian Wooldridge 
Management Editor and Schumpeter Columnist, The Economist.  Formerly: Washington Bureau Chief and Lexington Columnist.

Dr Pippa Malmgren 
President and Founder, Principalis; London;  Formerly: Member, President's Working Group on Financial Markets, President's Working Group on Corporate Governance and Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, National Economic Council; President, Malmgren and Company, London; Deputy Head, Global Investment Strategy, UBS Warburg, London.  Advisory Board Member, MIT Legatum Center for Development and Entrepreneurship; A Governor and a Member of the Business Committee, The Ditchley Foundation.
Ms Frances O'Grady 
General Secretary (2013-), formerly Deputy General Secretary (2003-12), Trades Union Congress; Member: Green Economy Council, High Pay Centre, IPPR Growth and Prosperity Advisory Panel, Commission on Living Standards.  Formerly: Member, Low Pay Commission.

Professor Robert Lawrence 
Albert L. Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, and Faculty Chair of The Practice of Trade Policy executive program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Formerly: Member, President's Council of Economic Advisers (1998-2000).

Ms Dominique Shure 
DPhil Candidate in Economics and Weidenfeld Scholar, Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford.  Formerly: Guest Researcher, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin (2011); Researcher, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin (2009); Fulbright Fellowship, Berlin (2008-09); Research Assistant, John W Kluge Center, Library of Congress (2006).