In partnership with American Ditchley
A Note by the Director (Ditchley 2011/08)
15-17 September 2011
After the emotional commemorations of the previous week, this conference was a chance to step back and look dispassionately at the consequences of 9/11, and try to make sense of the consequences of this huge event for the US and the rest of the world. We did not spend too much time on the nature of the event itself, or rehashing the rights and wrongs of the response to it, though we could not entirely escape the latter. Instead we tried to look at the broad trends over the last ten years, and at what the next decade might bring. We had a group representing many different points of view, national and political, and could not agree on everything. But there was an interesting degree of consensus in some key areas.
Our starting point was to ask how far 9/11 had represented a historic turning point in world events, comparable for example to 1918, 1945 or 1989 in the twentieth century. It had clearly been extremely emotional, particularly for the Americans, and its nightmarish quality had captured the imaginations of billions of people around the world. It had dramatically changed US psychology by puncturing Americans’ sense of invulnerability and ending the sense of triumph and power which had followed the end of the Cold War. It had dictated a lot of American and other western behaviour for the subsequent years. It had led directly or indirectly to two wars. The ‘war on terror’ had dominated much of government policies and efforts, particularly in Washington. Resources, thinking time and efforts spent on the response to 9/11 had obviously not been able to be devoted elsewhere. There was a major opportunity cost to be added up. Would the US have responded differently and better to the rise of China, to the economic challenges of the future or to the gathering financial crisis, had its attention not been on Afghanistan and Iraq? One lasting legacy of 9/11 (and of other terrorist attacks) was the onerous security precautions imposed on millions of travellers every single day, at great cost and inconvenience.
Nevertheless the consensus was that 9/11, while a date which would always stick in the mind of the current generation, had not been a historic turning point of quite the depth that many people had imagined at the time. The fundamental trends of the last ten years, including the shift of economic and political power from West to East, the rise of the internet, and the effects of climate change had been under way well before and independently of 9/11, and 9/11 had not had a major influence on them. While it could be argued that the war on terror had worsened the fiscal deficit through its trillions of dollars of cost, and taken government eyes of the financial ball, it was hard to argue that this had created, as opposed to worsened, the financial crisis itself. Terrorism, properly seen as a tactic, not a movement, had not fundamentally threatened our resilient democratic societies, though movements using terrorism could destroy the current polities in Pakistan or Afghanistan. In any case, it would now be good to get away from using expressions like ‘the post 9/11 world’ and think of the next decade in different terms. It was unlikely that we would still be talking about ’20 years after 9/11’ in the way that we were discussing the last ten years.
The police/intelligence/security response to 9/11, and the good international counter-terrorism cooperation which had emerged from it, had helped prevent further attacks on that scale, though we should not forget the bombs in e.g. London and Madrid, and there was a tendency to count only terrorist attacks in the West, as opposed to Iraq, Pakistan or elsewhere. It was harder to be sure that we were safer than we had been before 9/11 - some felt that we had put ‘a big padlock on the front door, but left the window wide open’, in other words done both too much and not enough. But a security response of this kind had clearly been necessary and justified. The invasion of Afghanistan and removal of the Taliban who had been sheltering Al Qaeda (AQ) was seen as a war of necessity, not of choice, despite the difficult position western forces now found themselves in ten years later. The same could not be said of Iraq, for most participants. It had brought terrorism to that country, served as a recruiting sergeant for terrorist movements more widely, and weakened the western soft power position in other ways, even though it had produced the huge benefit of getting rid of Saddam Hussein. The net result, paradoxically, had also been to strengthen Iran. If the AQ intention had been to suck the US into damaging behaviour in the Islamic world, it had certainly succeeded. The comparison was made with ju-jitsu, where a weak fighter used the strength of his opponent to force him to do things he did not want or mean to do.
On the wider question of whether the response to 9/11 had achieved the right balance between security/kinetic/military measures, and those based more on politics, ideas and values, the general view was that it had not. ‘Going after the bad guys’ had been a natural and inevitable reaction which had had its effect in preventing further attacks, certainly. But terrorism could not be defeated by military/security means alone, if indeed it made sense at all to talk of ‘defeating’ terrorism. (Using the ‘war on terror’ terminology was seen by most if not all participants as a serious mistake - why had we not talked of the war on AQ?). There was little doubt that AQ had been much weakened, both by the killing of much of its leadership and the security pressure constantly exerted upon it, and by its own basic mistakes, in particular alienating much of mainstream Muslim opinion through its bloodthirsty and sectarian approach in Iraq and elsewhere. If the US had overreacted to 9/11, and overreached itself, the same was true of AQ. It had discredited Sunni radicalism in many ways, and the latter might now morph into something less violent.
However AQ had not gone away, had a leader skilled in the use of modern communications tools in the shape of Al Zawahiri, and continued to exploit anti-western feeling in many parts of the world. It had ‘spun off’ a number of loosely connected jihadist movements and persuaded them to pursue the campaign against the West globally, as well as fighting their local causes. Some of these movements were now more threatening in operational terms than AQ itself. Jihadist rhetoric and the idea of martyrdom continued to find a ready audience in much of the Islamic world, and there was ever more inflammatory and dangerous material on the internet. We were not winning the struggle for hearts and minds as we would want. Too many people in the world did not even believe 9/11 had happened in the way usually presented, and Osama bin Laden (OBL) remained a potent anti-western symbol. We needed to develop a much more convincing narrative of western views and intentions. The future struggle against AQ and its associated movements should be 90% political and 10% kinetic rather than the other way round, as it had been for the last ten years.
We discussed whether this campaign against AQ could be described as an ideological struggle. We thought not, on the whole, since AQ’s beliefs did not really add up to an ideology. It was also significant and encouraging that AQ and OBL had not featured in the Arab spring, as many had pointed out. They had shown that a small number of people with few resources could do huge damage and provoke a massive reaction. However, as with most such movements, they could only destroy, not build. There would surely be more attacks, possibly even more ‘spectaculars’, but we doubted that they would have much political resonance. The recent ‘wave’ of terrorist attacks might peter out, as others had before, if we did not help it by over-reacting. We should not allow a small group of unrepresentative people to set our agenda or drive us down roads which we did not want to take.
Getting the narrative right involved careful choice of messages and use of labels, avoiding those which suggested an automatic link between terrorism and Islam, and working with local Muslim communities, rather than making them feel targeted and pushing them into paranoia. If we did not embrace our own communities we left them open to manipulation by others. The post 9/11 question ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ retained its validity but was matched by a question from the Islamic world about why we seemed to hate Muslims so much. Singapore had useful experience to share in building resilient communities, and in rehabilitating terrorist detainees and their families. The UK had also done a lot of work in this area, albeit with mixed results from the Prevent strategy, while such programmes had hardly started in the US. ‘Home-grown’ terrorists were probably now the biggest threat to western countries. Prisons were a very important recruiting ground for future terrorists, but had been relatively neglected. The struggle against radicalisation was far from won, and the problem was still not well enough understood. Issues such as the Palestinian dispute had not inspired AQ originally but were very skilfully exploited by them to rouse discontent and recruit new volunteers.
The US and the West more widely had lost the moral high ground in a major way after the invasion of Iraq and over issues like Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and rendition. The biggest international promoter of human rights had lost a lot of credibility. This had weakened US and western soft power. Compromising fundamental values in the battle against terrorism was seen as ultimately self-defeating. This had been a victory for OBL. Our obsession with terrorism was also a mistake and gave the terrorists a status they did not deserve. But we were reminded that, importantly, this was not the perception of most Americans. Another attack in the US could still trigger another massive response.
We discussed at some length the current ’surgical’ tactics being used against AQ, the Taliban and others in the shape of drone attacks and raids by special forces. There seemed little doubt of their effectiveness in removing senior leaders and weakening the organisations concerned. While accompanying civilian casualties were not insignificant, either from mistakes or collateral damage, such attacks could be seen as relatively precise compared to what had gone before. But there were grave doubts about their legality under international law in some quarters, even though the Administration themselves seemed confident of their legal ground, at least where identified leaders were concerned. There were also worries that they could be counter-productive in political terms – while the Pakistan authorities might be turning a blind eye, for example, the raids were undoubtedly deepening Pakistani public hostility to the US. This was a difficult balance to strike. The reality for now was that, because of their apparent military effectiveness, most people were just looking the other way. Criticising Guantanamo while staying silent about the drones was paradoxical in some ways – at least those in Guantanamo had a second chance.
Much better use of the criminal justice system was seen as a valuable but under-used weapon against terrorists, in developing as well as developed countries. At present few were charged or successfully prosecuted. In many cases the necessary laws against terrorists eg against financing of terrorists, still did not exist.
Our next big area of attention was the effects of 9/11 on global governance. It was clear that the opportunity of the early global unity had been quickly squandered by the nature of much of the response, and the US determination to do things its own way. Iraq had been the final nail in this coffin. Effective global governance looked significantly harder now than before 9/11. But there were many other reasons for this, and it was hard to allocate a pre-eminent role to 9/11. Power was now much more widely spread and there were more actors, state and non-state. We were living in a time of flux and uncertainty. While many of the problems were clearly international and global in nature, and the world was ever more interdependent, especially economically, through investment as well as trade, there was currently a greater temptation to try to solve problems in a less collective, more narrowly nationalistic way. The economic and financial crisis had had a big influence on this.
Did this matter? The world was in many ways a safer place than fifty years ago, with the risk of nuclear holocaust much reduced and interstate wars apparently almost a thing of the past. The threat from so-called rogue states could not be discounted, particularly those seemingly bent on acquiring at least the capability to build nuclear weapons, if not the weapons themselves, such as Iran. But overall the security threats looked containable. The US was still the world’s most significant power by far, militarily and economically, but it could not dictate events, had lost confidence in itself for now, and risked lapsing into isolationism. The western liberal world in general seemed to have lost confidence in its own model, despite developments such as the Arab spring. China and other big emerging/emerged powers did not seem yet to have developed global visions. China was admired for its effective decision-making but was not seen as an attractive model in other respects.
So how could the big issues be managed in a multi-polar world? No-one thought there was a simple institutional fix. The UN had in some ways recovered its role after being ignored over Iraq. It retained its universality and the unique capacity to confer legitimacy. Its role in Libya had been significant. However the need to get all countries on board was a huge limitation on reaching agreement, as had been graphically illustrated over climate change in Copenhagen. UN Security Council reform still looked stuck for the foreseeable future, though the search for agreement had to continue. The G20 had started promisingly in the financial crisis but had now seemingly been put back on the shelf, which was a pity, given its reasonably representative nature. In the absence of a single overarching threat, it did not seem to be seen as necessary by enough of its members. One way forward would be to broaden its agenda and take it out of the hands of finance ministers, where it currently seemed to be stuck. The issue was not shortage of opportunities to meet – summit fatigue was a real problem for many leaders – but the lack of effective decisions coming out of such meetings.
In this uncertain period, doing something was better than doing nothing. Therefore regional and bilateral agreements, deals between groups of countries, and helpful unilateral steps in areas like climate change should be pursued where possible, even if they fell short of the ideal – ‘mini-lateralism’. Regional organisations could play a helpful role despite their lack of real capacity in most cases. Some participants also saw an increased role for medium-sized powers with some credibility, where the big powers were incapable of generating movement for whatever reason. Canada, Australia, Indonesia, Turkey could be examples of countries with non-threatening, persuasive, coalition-building abilities. Even if we had inadequate decision-making and policy-making machinery overall, we could still find good ‘horses for courses’ for individual problems. We also needed to focus on strengthening the rule of law and a rules-based international order, as well as the more institutional issues. Meanwhile what might improve the prospects for global cooperation and moves towards more systematic global governance? Renewed economic growth in the developed world would no doubt help, but re-establishing self-confidence in some key players, and confidence in the international community’s ability to find solutions collectively, would be more fundamental.
We discussed the future of international interventionism. There was no doubt of a certain intervention fatigue among both governments and publics, given the huge costs and lack of obvious success in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time the international community had increasingly signed up to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (though this was about far more than just the last resort of military intervention), the determination to avoid another Rwanda was still there, and the apparent relative success of the NATO action in Libya might give intervention a new lease of life. Libya showed that intervention did not have to involve major land operations, casualties among the intervening forces, or huge costs. Drone attacks and special forces operations could also be seen as new types of more surgical intervention. In any case we needed to go back to work on defining the guidelines for the use of force, and establishing more of a consensus on the criteria. The question of who would be willing and able to carry out future humanitarian interventions also needed to be looked at, since the chances of any kind of standing international force looked minimal. Regional powers were often a better option than western ones, though the capacity question could be acute even if the will were there.
Our third set of questions concerned shifting power relations in the last decade and the future, with obvious links to the debate about global governance. The current situation was seen as one of increasing diffusion of power, involving non-state actors as well as the big emerging economies of the East. It was unclear what role the emerging powers would want to play, and whether they would want to change the global rules. Would we see a new world order coming to pass, or merely an old-fashioned kind of global disorder? Governments, in the developed world in particular, seemed to have ever greater difficulty controlling events and dealing with problems. There was a loss of public confidence in scientists and experts, comparable to the earlier loss of confidence in religion. Predicting what might happen next seemed more and more complex and unreliable. The globalization of information, where everyone could know everything more or less instantly, did not seem to be helping good decision-making. The global system overall gave a strong impression of fragility. People felt global institutions were overwhelmed and did not know where to look for a lead, at the same time as their expectations about problem-solving were higher than ever. But perhaps this was the norm, and the last 60 years of relative good order and prosperity had just been exceptional. Moreover governments could not take all the strain – civil society, business, the media etc all had to play their part.
In any case we should avoid the mistake of projecting current trends forward into the future in a linear way. Human history showed the folly of this. Thus the rise of China and India was unlikely to follow a smooth path, and we should be ready for the possibility of many different scenarios – planning should be focussed on increasing open-mindedness, flexibility and nimbleness of response rather than on trying to make predictions. The world was going to go on becoming more complex, and we would just have to learn to live with what one participant termed ‘messy-lateralism’.
There were many complaints about the lack of leadership, both at national and global level, though others suggested that this reflected the complexity of the modern world and the absence of a single overarching threat. In any case current gloom could easily be overdone. The diffusion of information also meant that norms of freedom and human rights were spreading, as we had seen in the Arab spring. Hundreds of millions of people were being lifted out of poverty by the economic success in the East. Soft power was now seen as no less important than hard power, which should be a good thing, even if claims that war was a thing of the past looked overdone. US soft power could recover, and indeed was recovering, from the blows of the post 9/11 response. International activity to prevent conflict, help reconciliation and provide peacekeeping was at an all-time high, though the results were not as satisfactory as we might hope. And history also taught us to respect human ingenuity and adaptability.
We debated how far it was right to talk of the decline of the US. Most participants thought this was not an accurate way to describe what was happening. Of course there had been a loss of confidence, to which 9/11 had contributed, and a shift of relative influence, economic above all, towards the East. More widely the western narrative was increasingly challenged, and the West was seen as having written the rules too much to its own advantage. At the same time, US military power remained overwhelming compared to any other nation or group of nations, and this would not change for the foreseeable future. Americans’ innovative, entrepreneurial spirit and the strength of its science base and excellent higher education institutions remained strong and would come through the present problems. Freedom and democracy remained attractive. There was no reason for undue pessimism or declinism.
The subject of the conference, and the wide-ranging nature of our debate, did not lend themselves easily to neat conclusions or recommendations. Nevertheless some trends of thought and areas for future reflection are worth summarising:
- Recognition that, however understandable and narrowly effective in some areas, the response to 9/11 had been in many ways an overreaction, which weakened, not strengthened, the institutions and values we were trying so hard to protect, and rewarded and gave credibility to the terrorists we were trying to defeat. This is an important lesson for the future;
- The need henceforth to put more focus on ideas, values and the deployment of soft power; and reaching out more effectively to Muslim communities, particularly those in our midst;
- The requirement for more and better use of criminal justice mechanisms in dealing with terrorists and their supporters;
- The need for more work on the legality of current measures such as drone and special forces attacks, important for keeping the vital moral high ground and exerting soft power;
- The urgency of developing a more convincing western narrative for the rest of the world about our policies and actions;
- The need for more work on the justification and criteria for international intervention, in the wake of Libya, to ensure that this approach remains fully available when needed, wherever possible on the basis of consent;
- Recognition of the need to fill gaps in global governance where we can, including through action in smaller groups wherever possible (coalitions of the willing), a reformed UN Security Council and revitalised G20, and the possible greater use of so-called second tier powers;
- A belief that we should be responding more urgently and effectively to the opportunities of the Arab spring, while recognising the danger of tainting what we wanted to support;
- Agreement on the need to restore our confidence in ourselves and our model, of which protecting and promoting our fundamental values is an important part, while avoiding arrogance and hubris;
If there were overall conclusions, they were that we should not go on allowing ourselves and our actions to be defined and conditioned by 9/11; and that we should not allow ourselves either to fall into exaggerated gloom about the state of the world and our place in it, despite the many complex problems we faced. We had a hard slog of a decade in front of us, but the international community was in many ways a safer and more civilised place, our capacity to innovate and progress through dialogue remained intact, and we had overcome graver crises before. We certainly could not afford to waste another decade, as we arguably had the last.
This Note reflects the Director’s personal impressions of the conference. No participant is in any way committed to its content or expression.
Chair: Professor Joseph Nye Jr
Distinguished Service Professor, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2004-); Formerly: Dean, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1995-2004); Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1994-95); Chairman, National Intelligence Council (1993-94); Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. A member of the Board of Directors, the American Ditchley Foundation. Author.
Ambassador Omar Samad
Afghan Diplomatic Service (2001-11). Formerly: Ambassador of Afghanistan to France (2009-11); Ambassador to Canada (2004-09). Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul (2001-04); CNN Commentator (2001).
Professor The Honourable Gareth Evans AO QC (Australia)
Chancellor, Australian National University; Honorary Professorial Fellow, University of Melbourne; Co-Chair, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, University of Melbourne (2008-). Formerly: President and Chief Executive, International Crisis Group, Brussels (2000-09). Member, UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats and Challenges (2004); Co-Chair, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2000-01); Foreign Minister, Canberra (1988-96).
Ambassador William Paterson PSM
Australian Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism, Canberra (2008-). Formerly: Ambassador to Thailand (2004-08); Head, Australian Government's Iraq Task Force (2002-03). Head, Anti-Terrorism Task Force (2001); Chief of Staff and Principal Adviser to the Foreign Minister (2000).
Mrs Yaprak Baltacioglu
Deputy Minister, Department of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, Ottawa.
Mr Edward Greenspon
Vice-President, Business Development, Star Media Group, Toronto. Formerly: Chair, GPS Project - Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age (2010); Editor-in-Chief, the Globe and Mail (2002-09).
Mr Paul Heinbecker
Director, Centre for Global Relations, Wilfrid Laurier University and Distinguished Fellow - International Relations, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario (2003-). Formerly: Canadian diplomatic service (1965-2003).
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Professor Huang Ping
Director-General, Institute of American Studies (2006-), and Director, Centre for World Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; President, Chinese Association of American Studies; Vice President, China National Association of International Relations.
Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière
Judge, Palais de Justice, Paris. Formerly: Head, Anti-Terrorist Division, Palais de Justice.
Dr Thomas Bagger
Director of Policy Planning, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin. Formerly: postings to Washington DC (2006-09); Ankara (2002-06); Prague (1996-98).
Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller
Senior Transatlantic Fellow (2009-), formerly Director, Berlin Office (2005-09), German Marshall Fund of the United States. Formerly: Die Zeit: Defence and International Security Editor (1998-2005); Correspondent on Human Rights, Refugee Crises and the UN (1994-98). A governor of the Ditchley Foundation.
Dr Mowaffak al Rubaie MRCP
Adviser on National Security Issues. Formerly: National Security Adviser, Iraq (2004-10); Member, Iraqi Council of Representatives (2004-10); Member, Governing Council of Iraq (2003-04); Spokesman, Islamic Dawa Party.
Dr Colum de Sales Murphy
President, Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations. Formerly: United Nations SRSG (1996-97); UN Deputy Head of Political Affairs, Bosnia (1994-95); UN Political Director, Somalia (1992); UN Human Rights Officer (1974-89). Author.
Dr Brynjar Lia
Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment; Author.
Minister Alexander Kramarenko
Russian Diplomatic Service (1974-); Deputy Head of Mission, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom (2011-). Formerly: Deputy Director, then Director, Policy Planning Department (2004-11); Minister-Counsellor, Russian Embassy, London (1999-2004); Head of Division, Deputy Director, North America Department (1996-99); Counsellor, Russian Embassy, Ottawa (1992-96).
Professor Rohan Gunaratna
Director, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, and Professor of Security Studies, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Senior Fellow, International Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma; International Advisory Board Member, International Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel; Advisory Board Member, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague; Steering Committee Member, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University; Author.
Mr Alex Allan
Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, The Cabinet Office. Formerly: Permanent Secretary, Department for Constitutional Affairs: UK Government e-envoy (1999-2000); High Commissioner, Australia (1997-99); Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister (1992-97).
Mr Con Coughlin
Executive Foreign Editor, The Daily Telegraph; Author.
Mr Alex Ellis
HM Diplomatic Service (1990-); Director of Strategy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Formerly: Ambassador to Portugal (2007-10); Adviser to the President of the European Commission (2005-07). A member of the Programme Committee, the Ditchley Foundation.
The Right Honourable Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman KCMG CBE FBA FKC (UK)
Vice Principal (Strategy & Development) and Professor of War Studies, King's College London (1982-). A governor of the Ditchley Foundation.
Ms Bronwen Maddox
Editor, Prospect Magazine (2010-); Columnist, The Times. Formerly: Chief Foreign Commentator (2006-10), Foreign Editor (1999-2006), US Editor (1996-99), The Times; Leader Writer, Financial Times; Director, Kleinwort Benson Securities (1991-96). A member of the Programme Committee and a governor of the Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Raffaello Pantucci
Associate Fellow, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London; Formerly: Associate, China Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations, Shanghai (2010-11); Visiting Scholar, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (2009-11); Research Associate, Transnational Threats and Political Risk programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006-10); Europe and Transatlantic Relations Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2003-06). Author.
Ms Jo Swinson
Member of Parliament (Liberal Democrat) for East Dunbartonshire (2005-); Deputy Leader, Scottish Liberal Democrats (2010-); Parliamentary Private Secretary to Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010-). Formerly: Shadow Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2008-10). A member of the Programme Committee, the Ditchley Foundation.
Sir Crispin Tickell GCMG KCVO
Formerly: Director, Policy Foresight Programme, Oxford Martin School (formerly James Martin 21st Century School), University of Oxford (2006-10); Chancellor, University of Kent (1996-2006); Chairman, Climate Institute of Washington DC (1990-2002); Warden, Green College Oxford (1990-97); British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York (1987-90); Permanent Secretary Overseas Development Administration (now DfID) (1984-87); British Ambassador to Mexico (1981-83). Author. A governor and a member of the Council of Management, the Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Mike Smith
Executive Director, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (2007-). Formerly: Australian Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism (2006-07); Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN, Geneva (2002-06); Chief of Staff to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra (1998-2002); Ambassador to Egypt and Sudan (1995-98); Minister (Political), Australian Embassy, Washington DC (1993-95); Ambassador to Algeria and Tunisia (1989-91); Counsellor, Australian Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva (1986-89).
The Honorable John Bellinger III
Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington DC; Adjunct Senior Fellow in International and National Security Law, Council on Foreign Relations; Member, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague. Formerly: Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, Washington DC (2005-09); Legal Adviser to the National Security Council (2001-05); Counsel for National Security Matters, Criminal Division, US Department of Justice (1997-2001).
The Honorable Charles DeWitt
Co-Owner, Lafayette Group Inc, Washington DC (1993-). Formerly: Director, National Institute of Justice (1990-93); Director of Border Security, The White House, Washington DC (1989-90); Director, Justice Division, San Jose, California (1978-84). A member of the Advisory Council, the American Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Christopher Kojm
Chairman, National Intelligence Council (2009-).
Mr Cary A Koplin
Managing Director, Investment Management Division, Neuberger Berman, LLC (2000-). Formerly: Managing Director, Schroder Wertheim & Co Inc/Wertheim & Co (1966-2000). President of the American Ditchley Foundation.
Dr Jane Holl Lute
Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security. Formerly: Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations; National Security Council. Formerly: Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations; National Security Council; Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, United Nations Foundation and Better World Fund; Head, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Senior Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; United States Army.
Ms Jami Miscik
President and Vice-Chairman, Kissinger Associates (2009- ); Member, President's Intelligence Board (2009- ). A member of the Board of Directors, the American Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Anthony Romero
Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union (2001-); Member of the New York Bar.
District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr
District Attorney, New York County District Attorney's Office (2010-); Member, Criminal Justice Council, New York City Bar Association; Member, Federal Bar Council; Member, New York Council of Defense Lawyers.
Mr Jeffrey Wright
MPhil Candidate in International Relations, Weidenfeld Scholar, Balliol College, Oxford University. Formerly: Social Science Research Analyst, US Department of Health and Human Services (2009-10).
Mr Casimir Yost
Director, Strategic Futures Group (2011-), and Director, Long Range Analysis Unit (2009-), National Intelligence Council.