Outcome and Input Data for 26 Post-WWII and Post Cold War Interventions

Excerpted from the fourth volume of the RAND History of Nation Building

Sustained Peace (2017)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Operation** | **Country** | **Sustained Peace****(2017)** |
| U.S. | Germany | Yes |
| U.S. | Japan | Yes |
| U.S. | Somalia (I) | No |
| U.S. | Haiti | Yes |
| U.S./NATO | Bosnia (I) | Yes |
| U.S./NATO | Kosovo | Yes |
| U.S./NATO | Afghanistan | No |
| U.S. | Iraq | No |
| UN | Belgian Congo | No |
| UN | Namibia | Yes |
| UN | El Salvador | Yes |
| UN | Cambodia | Yes |
| UN | Mozambique | Yes |
| UN | Eastern Slavonia | Yes |
| UN | East Timor | Yes |
| EUR | Albania | Yes |
| EUR | Sierra Leone | Yes |
| EUR | Macedonia | Yes |
| EUR | Cote d'Ivoire | Yes |
| EUR | DR Congo | No |
| EUR | Bosnia (II) | Yes |
| AFR | Burundi | Yes |
| AFR | CAR | No |
| AFR | Darfur/Sudan | No |
| AFR | Comoros | Yes |
| AFR | Somalia (II) | No |

NOTES: (1) The Lake Chad Basin case has been excluded from this table because scores for multiple countries could not be aggregated in a meaningful way. (2) As of the end of 2017, intra-state conflict remained active in six of the countries contained in this table: Afghanistan, CAR, Darfur/Sudan, DRC, Iraq, and Somalia. Additionally, although the Lake Chad Basin case does not appear in this table, armed conflict by and against Boko Haram continues here. By definition, these countries have not experienced sustained peace. Additionally, it should be noted that two countries (Burundi and Haiti) are also at peace at the time of this writing, but they experienced brief returns to violence after the departures of U.S.-led and African-led peacekeeping missions in 1996 and 2004, respectively.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Huff, “PITF-State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2016 data set,” Center for Systemic Peace, revised June 21, 2017.

Level of Freedom (2018)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Operation** | **Country** | **First Year of Intervention** | **Freedom****Rating****(2018)** | **Freedom** **House Score****(2018)** | **Freedom House Score (Yr 1, or earliest available *in italics*)** | **Change in Freedom House Score****(Yr 1 - 2018)** |
| U.S. | Germany | 1945 | Free | 1.0 | *1.5 (1998)* | *0.5* |
| U.S. | Japan | 1945 | Free | 1.0 | *1.5 (1998)* | *0.5* |
| U.S. | Somalia (I) | 1992 | Not free | 7.0 | *7.0 (1999)* | *0.0* |
| U.S. | Haiti | 1994 | Partly free | 5.0 | *5.0 (1998)* | *0.0* |
| U.S./NATO | Bosnia (I) | 1995 | Partly free | 4.0 | *5.0 (1998)* | *0.0* |
| U.S./NATO | Kosovo | 1999 | Partly free | 3.5 | 5.0 | 1.5 |
| U.S./NATO | Afghanistan | 2001 | Not free | 5.5 | 7.0 | 1.5 |
| U.S. | Iraq | 2003 | Not free | 5.5 | 7.0 | 1.5 |
| UN | Belgian Congo | 1960 | Not free | 6.5 | *6.5 (1998)* | *0.0* |
| UN | Namibia | 1989 | Free | 2.0 | *2.5 (1999)* | *0.5* |
| UN | El Salvador | 1991 | Free | 2.5 | *2.5 (1999)* | *0.0* |
| UN | Cambodia | 1991 | Not free | 5.5 | *6.0 (1998)* | *0.5* |
| UN | Mozambique | 1992 | Partly free | 4.0 | *3.5 (1999)* | *–0.5* |
| UN | Eastern Slavonia | 1996 | Free | 1.5 | *4.0 (1998)* | *2.5* |
| UN | East Timor | 1999 | Free | 2.5 | 5.0 | 2.5 |
| EUR | Albania | 1997 | Partly free | 3.0 | *4.5 (1998)* | *1.5* |
| EUR | Sierra Leone | 1998 | Partly free | 3.0 | 4.0 | 1.0 |
| EUR | Macedonia | 2001 | Partly free | 3.5 | 3.5 | 0.0 |
| EUR | Cote d'Ivoire | 2002 | Partly free | 4.0 | 4.5 | 0.5 |
| EUR | DR Congo | 1999 | Not free | 6.5 | 6.5 | 0.0 |
| EUR | Bosnia (II) | 2004 | Partly free | 4.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 |
| AFR | Burundi | 2001 | Not free | 6.5 | 6.0 | –0.5 |
| AFR | CAR | 2002 | Not free | 7.0 | 5.0 | –2.0 |
| AFR | Sudan/Darfur | 2004 | Not free | 7.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 |
| AFR | Comoros | 2006 | Partly free | 3.5 | 4.0 | 0.5 |
| AFR | Somalia (II) | 2007 | Not free | 7.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 |
| NOTES: (1) The Lake Chad Basin case has been excluded from this table because scores for multiple countries could not be aggregated in a meaningfully way. (2) Freedom House scores range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). (3) 1998 is the first year for which Freedom House scores are available. In cases where the intervention came before 1998, we have added the data in 1998 or 1999 in italics. (4) Freedom House scores were not available for the sub-national regions of Eastern Slavonia and Darfur, so those for Croatia and Sudan, respectively, have been used as proxies. (5) In Appendix Table A.5, we also present data from the Polity score, which are broadly comparable to these results. |

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Freedom House, “Freedom in the World” (2018).

Refugee Returns After Five Years (Percentage)

NOTES: (1) Germany and Japan are excluded because all refugees were stranded as a result of offensive operations by a state military or deliberate government colonization, not civilians fleeing a conflict. (2) Belgian Congo is excluded because there were insufficient data. (3) Comoros is excluded because the number of refugees was negligible (less than 100 in the first year of intervention). (4) The Lake Chad Basin countries are excluded because reliable figures could not be aggregated for the districts affected by the Boko Haram conflict. (5) Darfur is excluded because reliable sub-national data could not be obtained.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); UNHCR Statistical Online Refugee Population Database.

Average Annual Growth in Per Capita GDP Over the First Five Years of Operations (percent)

NOTES: (1) Reliable GDP data were not available for Somalia, Darfur, and Eastern Slavonia, so they are not included in this figure. (2) Data could not meaningfully be aggregated for the Lake Chad Basin countries, so data for that case has been excluded as well.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); IMF, International Financial Statistics Database; World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.

Average Annual Per Capita Assistance Over First Two Years of Operations (2000 US$)

NOTES: (1) Per capita aid to Germany is aid to the U.S. sector only. (2) Sub-national Official Development Assistance (ODA) data for the Darfur region not available, so it has been excluded. (3) ODA data for areas of the Lake Chad Basin affected by armed conflict with Boko Haram could also not be obtained, so this case is excluded. (4) Official Develop Assistance (ODA) in current dollars has been converted to constant 2000 US$ using the GDP deflator.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.

Peak Military Presence (Number of Troops Deployed)

NOTES: (1) In three cases, leadership transitioned between continuous lead actors: In Bosnia in 2004, the EU (EUFOR) assumed responsibility from the U.S./NATO (IFOR/SFOR); in Burundi in 2004, the UN (ONUB) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIB); and in Darfur in 2008, the UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIS). In Bosnia, US/NATO forces deployed under IFOR/SFOR peaked at 60,000 in 1995, while those deployed under the EU mission (EUFOR) peaked at 5,700 in 2005. In Darfur, AU forces deployed under AMIS peaked at 5,874 in 2006, while those deployed under the joint AU-UN mission (UNNAMID) peaked at 17,778 in 2012. In Burundi, AU military troops deployed under AMIB peaked at 3,128 in 2004, while those deployed under the UN mission (ONUB) peaked at 5,400 in 2005. (2) In four cases, European or African forces operated coincidentally with – but as distinct missions from – an ongoing UN operation: In Sierra Leone, UK forces operated alongside UN forces; in Cote d’Ivoire French forces operated alongside UN forces; in DR Congo, EU forces operated alongside UN forces; and in CAR, AU forces operated alongside UN forces. In each of these cases, the UN forces (and, indeed, total forces) peaked years after the European or African forces peaked. Note that in Sierra Leone the peak UK troop level occurred in 2000, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2002; the total troop level peaked in 2002 when approximately 100 UK troops were deployed alongside some 17,368 UN troops. In Cote d’Ivoire, the peak French troop level occurred in 2007, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2011. In the DRC, the peak EU troop level occurred in 2006, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2014. And in CAR, the peak AU troop level occurred in 2014, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2016.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Center on International Cooperation, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008” (Center on International Cooperation, 2008); IPI Peacekeeping Database, Providing for Peacekeeping; and summary tables in chapters above.

Peak Military Presence (Number of Troops Deployed per 1,000 Inhabitants)

NOTES: (1) See note in Figure 8.1 regarding missions involving contiguous and overlapping national and international contingents. (2) Per capita military presence for the Lake Chad Basin have been excluded because of the difficulty of attributing MNJTF presence to sub-national regions.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Center on International Cooperation, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008” (Center on International Cooperation, 2008); IPI Peacekeeping Database, Providing for Peacekeeping; summary tables in chapters above.

Peak Civilian Police Presence (Number of Police Deployed)

NOTES: (1) In the U.S.-led missions in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, no civilian police were deployed (except in advisory roles). (2) All the civilian police in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire were from the UN, not European-led missions. (3) In the DRC, the EU deployed a small police contingent of a couple dozen personnel alongside the much larger UN one; the UN police presence in DRC peaked in 2013. (4) In CAR, civilian police deployed under AU's MISCA mission peaked at 880 in 2014, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN mission (MINUSCA) peaked at about 1,700 in 2017. (5) In Darfur, civilian police deployed under AU's AMIS mission peaked at 1,456 in 2006, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) peaked at about 5,228 in 2011. (6) No civilian police were deployed to Burundi under the AU's AMIB mission; subsequently 97 policed deployed under the UN's ONUB mission in 2005. (7) In the Lake Chad Basin, no police are deployed as part of MNJTF.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Center on International Cooperation, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008” (Center on International Cooperation, 2008); IPI Peacekeeping Database, Providing for Peacekeeping; summary tables in chapters above.

Peak Civilian Police Presence (Number of Police Deployed per 1,000 Inhabitants)

NOTES: See note in Figure 8.3 regarding missions involving contiguous and overlapping national and international contingents.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Center on International Cooperation, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008” (Center on International Cooperation, 2008); IPI Peacekeeping Database, Providing for Peacekeeping; summary tables in chapters above.

Peak Police-to-Military Ratio (Number of Police Deployed per 1,000 Troops)

NOTES: For Sierra Leone, the ratio is based on peak total of UN and UK troops deployed in 2002 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2004. For Cote d’Ivoire, the ratio is based on peak total of UN and French troops deployed in 2007 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2013. For DRC, the ratio is based on the peak of UN troops deployed in 2014 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2013. For Burundi, the ratio is based on the peak of UN troops deployed in 2005 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2005. For CAR, the ratio is based on the peak of UN troops deployed in 2016 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2016. For Darfur, the ratio is based on the peak of UN/AU hybrid troops deployed in 2012 versus the peak of UN/AU hybrid police deployed in 2011.

SOURCES: RAND, MG-722 (2008); Center on International Cooperation, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008” (Center on International Cooperation, 2008); IPI Peacekeeping Database, Providing for Peacekeeping; summary tables in chapters above.

Duration of Operations (Years)

Notes: (1) \* Indicates ongoing operation. Duration data are current through mid-2018. (2) Duration data are rounded up to the next whole year integer; for instance, if an operation lasted 4 years and 3 months, it is counted as 5 years. (3) Duration data only counts major peacekeeping operations; it does not count smaller political and security advisory and training missions. (4) Several European-led and African-led missions overlapped with or were contiguous with major UN-led peacekeeping missions. Overlapping missions (Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, and CAR) are illustrated as adjacent bars. Contiguous missions (Bosnia, Burundi, and Darfur) are illustrated as stacked bars. (5) More specifically, in Sierra Leone, the UN mission began in July 1998 and ended in December 2005; the UK mission began in May 2000 and was concluded by the end of 2000, though a small number of British advisors remained for over a decade. In Cote d'Ivoire, the French mission began in September 2002 and concluded in January 2015; the UN peacekeeping mission began in April 2004, replacing the UN political mission which had been in place before that, and concluded in 2017. In the DRC, the UN mission began in November 1999 and is ongoing; European troops were deployed to the country for two periods: June-September 2003 and July-November 2006. In Burundi, two African-led missions were deployed between 2001-2004; they were succeeded by a UN peacekeeping mission from June 2004-December 2006. In CAR, multiple African-led missions deployed between 2002-2014; these have overlapped with an increasingly robust UN peacekeeping presence. However, data from these missions is likely to be of lower reliability than the other nation-building missions.