A Note by the Director Ditchley 2009/08)
11-13 September 2009
For the first Ditchley conference of the new season, we gathered under the auspices of Canadian Ditchley in the splendid setting of Le Chateau Frontenac in Quebec City to discuss the opening up of the Arctic Ocean under the impact of climate change. All the Arctic coastal states were represented, together with a broad range of other expertise and interests, and a lively exchange materialised.
Within the relatively short time available for an enormous field, it was important to decide the urgent issues. With the international machinery so far working well, particularly in and around the Arctic Council, most participants felt that it was important to identify, and if possible to close, the gaps. There was, not unexpectedly, a difference of view as to whether or not the Arctic Council had everything under control. But no-one contested the importance of greater clarity about who were the valid shareholders in what the Arctic had to offer; how effective the current arrangements were and what more was needed by way of rules and standards; what, by comparison with other sensitive areas for development, made the Arctic special; and how different areas of interest could be pursued internationally with as little disagreement as possible.
The conference benefited from some excellent presentations on what was actually happening to the Arctic region, still one of the world’s most hostile environments, with or without melting ice. These brought out the inevitability of change and the complexity of the interlinking issues. Our conversation then proceeded to cover a significant amount of ground, which is worth spelling out: the territorial arrangements, claims and rights of access and passage; the implications of climate change in all its aspects; the effect of changes on the peoples of the north; the exploitation of the Arctic’s economic assets; the requirements of shipping interests and the implications of much higher shipping volumes; the expansion of tourism; access to fishing stocks and the effect of climate change on fish populations; biodiversity protection; the need for new infrastructure to serve greater activity and larger populations in the north; the impact of science and the need to organise relevant new projects; new initiatives in education and training for Arctic matters; and, not least, the governance of all of this.
There was a healthy discussion of the ownership of the Arctic, in all its senses. This centred around the coastal states, whose jurisdiction over Arctic lands and territorial waters was, with marginal exceptions, indisputable, but which had to decide fairly and sensibly on the internal division of interest between current Arctic residents and their domestic population as a whole. Next came the countries of the Arctic Council, whose work on the handling of international questions was so far regarded as largely satisfactory, but whose capacity to handle the full evolution of changes in the Arctic was a matter for debate. Alongside the Arctic Council came the observer states, in two categories of involvement. In the next concentric circle stood countries and organisations, including in the private sector, with a strong interest in the economic assets of the region, covering shipping routes, fishing, oil, gas and minerals, tourism and other business products. At the global level there was a strong environmental concern, with a wide range of scientific, political, economic and public involvement in the interplay between the Arctic and the rest of the world’s environmental concerns. All of these areas were of growing interest to the world’s media, who – from a relatively slow start over the past decade or so – could be expected to display a heightened interest not just in the sectors described above but also in any sign of political tension or conflict between all these stakeholders.
We all agreed that the prospects of serious disputes over the Arctic region had been over-dramatised in recent media comment. The general opinion around the table was that the international institutions and arrangements handling Arctic business were sufficient for the foreseeable future; and no-one proposed the creation of new ones. There were differences, nevertheless, over whether everything was being managed satisfactorily, because there was a great deal of work to do in all these areas, some of which was becoming quite urgent. There was also a strong feeling, even if it was not universal, that the linkages between the central issues listed above were both significant and unpredictable and that holistic direction for the development of the Arctic was missing. The representatives of the coastal states present pushed back on this, saying that their national jurisdictions were fully aware of the issues and were dealing with them responsibly. Others pointed to the wisdom of focussing on each of the distinct sectors of business separately. This did not fully satisfy those who suspected that the pace of change in the Arctic might be faster than the evolution of the instruments of governance, particularly when viewed through the prism of the rest of the world’s interests.
We asked, but perhaps did not answer fully, the question of why the Arctic was so special. The conference recognised the need for care in arguing exceptionalism for the region, when the world as a whole had very significant environmental concerns elsewhere, not least in the health of the oceans globally. The tropical rainforests were another case in point; and other indigenous peoples were being very severely affected by the speed of change, often with unsatisfactory answers to their problems so far. It was pointed out nonetheless that in the Arctic the rise of temperatures was faster and greater than elsewhere; that the melting of Arctic ice was the most significant physical change to oceans anywhere; that this was an inaccessible and largely uninhabited area except at the edges; and that this was a new area for global attention which, if we got our arrangements right from the beginning, we had a chance of managing more satisfactorily than any other.
The working groups focussed on the economic and environmental aspects, on Arctic governance and on international law and security policy as applied to the region. We looked closely at the rapidly growing list of economic activities, the vast majority of which were on or close to the coasts and therefore under national jurisdiction. If and when greater swathes of territory became accessible, huge investment in new activity could be expected. It was pointed out that this would require clarity on sovereignty and legal ownership; the proper recognition of the interests and requirements of local communities; and an acceptance of the rights and interests of shareholders across the globe. Any blurring of these issues would both restrict investment and generate disputes. Shipping and fishing were regarded as the two sectors which were most likely to interact with non-coastal states’ interests. There were differences of view as to how quickly the north-west and north-east passages would open up for regular shipping, some wondering whether this would ever happen and others pointing out that plans were already under way. It was also noted that half of the fish eaten in Europe and north America came from stocks within the Arctic Circle. Half-full and half-empty glasses began to feature with growing regularity in our discussion.
As for climate change, we had to note the circular connection between the rest of the world’s emission of carbon and developments in the Arctic. There was nothing the Arctic Council (AC) could do about the inevitability of climate change or, in their own forum, about the prospects for the Copenhagen meeting in December. But the results of climate change had to be managed and adapted to; and scientific contributions and projects from outside the AC would need to be accommodated. The environment was perhaps the most important general area, we thought, where Arctic and Rest of World processes needed to be aligned.
Our discussion of governance issues centred around the Arctic Council. It was pointed out that the functions and activities of the Council were not, in formal terms, as comprehensive as the set of challenges faced by the Arctic. But there was a general recognition that the Council was expanding its scope sensibly. There was greater doubt, however, as to whether it could cope with everything with the comprehensiveness and urgency that many saw as necessary. In particular, many participants felt that governance had to transcend the national level because so many international and indeed global issues were involved. When words like “consensus”, “values”, “inclusion” and “self-regulation” began to appear more frequently in Arctic discussion, it was an indication that some innovation was needed in international structures. Perhaps there was a need to look at governance in terms of horizontal processes, linking ongoing activities within national jurisdictions. Examples were the assessment and monitoring of current activity; the formulation of new policy on shipping and tourism; the setting of regulations and standards; and, an area still in its infancy, the question of implementation and enforcement. On shipping, the International Maritime Organisation was already involved and it was not impossible that other specific UN bodies might also be brought in in other areas. New treaties might in due course be needed. Self-regulation was an area to be explored further, particularly in oil, gas and minerals, because multinational companies knew perfectly well that irresponsible behaviour would be damaging to their own interests. But the business of involving a larger number of countries and entities was proceeding only slowly, with claims for observership at the Arctic Council, for instance, currently delayed. We also noted, but did not get into proposals to address, the need to square the circle between local, national and international interests in an era of rapid change. We had to assume that this would come out in the wash as existing institutional machinery was built on.
The views of the peoples of the north, particularly in Canada, were well-represented at the conference and it was accepted by everyone that their interests had to be respected. There was no doubt that they were facing a challenge, as the very inaccessibility of the frozen north so far had been a protection for them. It was clear that the spread and intensity of competing interests as the Arctic opened up would cause them serious difficulties; and their concerns would not have been fully assuaged by the way the discussion went. In particular, we noted a lack of consistent access for them into the international discussions: although granted observer status on the AC, they were obliged to make their representations largely through their own national processes. Even within their own councils there were bound to be differences between those who wished to preserve tradition and others attracted by the economic and business prospects. More needed to be done to avoid bad outcomes here.
We looked at the story of the Antarctic so far and asked whether lessons could be drawn. The differences between the two polar areas were agreed to be much greater than the similarities. But environmental, ecological, shipping and fishing practices, especially as regards monitoring systems, were relevant and were being followed up. We otherwise noted that the area of communications was still undeveloped in the Arctic: for instance, new satellites would be needed for consistent coverage in the region. There was a need for policing and monitoring of regulations and standards to keep up with the increase in activity. Participants noted that, so far, the introduction of regulations had been quite strict in national jurisdictions. Slight concern was voiced that if this continued it might be a deterrent for the opening up of legitimate economic activity. The prevailing feeling, however, was apprehension that as activity increased the general observation of high standards would deteriorate.
As for the future of the Arctic Council (not itself, it was noted, a regulatory body), there was a good deal of debate about how it should develop. Given the urgency and broad impact of many of the sectoral issues in the Arctic, there was a case for the Council to take on a higher profile internationally. The next ministerial meeting, it was suggested, might be turned into a heads of state/government meeting. Observer status might need extending as other states increased their interest: China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea were mentioned in this respect. We spent more time, however, discussing whether the EU should have a formal connection with the Arctic Council. The Europeans were pressing for this, as the EU’s interests in the region were certainly going to expand in the future. The age-old distinction between the EU and its member states, several of whom had their own national status in and around the Arctic Council, raised itself again, with non-EU participants in this discussion showing some impatience with the EU’s perennial obsession with representation. Most participants concluded that the EU’s claim could not be ignored and that they would at least have to be part of the conversation. It would make sense to decide soon on the shape and form of their place at the table.
The working group on international law and security gave a reasonable chit to the international community’s performance so far. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provided a framework for the settlement of virtually all the territorial issues. The responsibility of coastal states and the Arctic Council covered much of the rest. Nevertheless the Arctic was now part of global change and public pressures would make themselves felt in unpredictable ways. There was room for improvement to the overall international framework for, for instance, economic and industrial exploitation of the area, for management of the shipping and fishing areas and for decision-making and implementation/enforcement. If the range of stakeholders increased, as it was likely to do, their legitimate concerns would have to be accommodated. No-one thought that this would become an area of great contention, merely that there was a good deal of work to be done within the institutions already established.
As for security issues, no-one believed that militarisation of the Arctic was going to become a problem, but we noted that the coastal states would be bound to try to control their own jurisdictions, including as part of national defence and security, as the Arctic ocean attracted more traffic and attention. Any potential increase in threats such as terrorism, smuggling, piracy or illegal trafficking would have to be countered as part of the region’s security infrastructure. But there was no reason why this should not be a field for positive cooperation just as much as other sectors, so long as the machinery of consultation worked well both amongst the Arctic Council states and between them and outside interests. Four specific recommendations were made in this respect:
· Continuing focus should be placed on dialogue and practical cooperation, with action at the level which produced the best specific answers;
· Public diplomacy and presentation needed more attention, out from the Arctic Council, through other governments and all the way to the global public. Most of the problems raised at this conference could be addressed by better communication. This also had to be two-way, in respect for instance of the EU’s interests;
· In the area of enforcement, further specific rules were needed (covered in the concluding section below), which would be a challenge for ministries of defence and others;
· Finally, the quicker states acted to ensure that the delineation of maritime territories was completed, the better.
The Arctic Council could lead in all these areas, but the conference was left with the feeling, in spite of protestations, that something was still missing as far as comprehensive handling of the linkages was concerned.
While the conference did not systematically address a list of conclusions to be drawn from our discussion it might be helpful for this Note to mention a number of thoughts that could be given further attention.
· It was a good thing that the mysteries of the Arctic were gradually being revealed, but its fragility was very evident. There was still a disconnect between power centres, local interests and economic opportunities. The question of how to ensure stability in the region within a single strategic conversation was not yet settled.
· The current institutions were probably adequate as a framework for governance into the future. But the responsibility of the coastal states in their own territory was partly diluted by the Arctic Council; and the Arctic Council was not a body with comprehensive authority for every issue. It was relatively young and could develop, but it would need a lot of work. In this respect it was good to hear of a US proposal to hold a meeting, perhaps on a wider basis than just the coastal states, to discuss search and rescue at sea. This might bring out more generally the range of obligations attached to involvement in the Arctic, in the recognition that sovereignty did not necessarily amount to adequate governance.
· With the Arctic Council in the lead on much of this, the interests of non-Arctic Council states were currently being handled rather haphazardly. There might be a case for better organisation amongst non-AC states of their shared interests.
· These questions raised the issue of strategic leadership, a sensitive issue when there was no natural apex for voluntary international coordination. It would need a firm political hand to tackle the most difficult issues. Perhaps, eventually, the climate change challenge would produce this through its global impact. To date, however, it was difficult to deny a slight sense of drift.
· Alongside this apprehension came some uneasiness that incremental change would turn into something much more abrupt. Accurate studies and assessments of the impact of Arctic change were needed. While many projects were proceeding individually, this deserved strategic coordination at the political level.
· We were in no doubt that the indigenous peoples had to be listened to, as they were more affected than anyone else and knew more of the detailed characteristics of the region than anyone else. The processes needed to empower them further.
· New regulation was certainly going to be needed. Self-discipline could be part of the answer in controlling new activities, but there were bound to be gaps. Monitoring and enforcement needed urgent attention.
· The expensiveness of everything in this challenging region came through strongly, particularly against the background of the economic downturn. Massive investments would be needed over the decades and public-private partnerships were advocated. Alongside the sharing of costs, good advocacy was needed for the most urgent investments. Some competition was healthy if it brought the best work to the top.
· There was a strong need for better education and training on Arctic issues and for better explanations at the public level of how best to develop the Arctic. This needed a new systematic approach.
· On the EU’s involvement, answers did not need to be so difficult to find. The Arctic Council was perhaps being a bit defensive in this respect. Nevertheless the EU needed to present its case more carefully.
· A special study was needed on biodiversity. Protections were not in place and marine reserves in particular needed to be established. People wondered whether Canada should not be in the lead on this.
· Tourism could no longer be regarded as a sparse activity, in spite of the harsh climate and the poor infrastructure. Outside states needed to help regulate the area. Until everyone was clear on where this sector was heading, careful restraints might be necessary.
· Exploitation of oil/gas and minerals had started some time ago and the pace of further interest would depend on the global economy. In such an expensive environment, companies would be looking for action at scale. They fully understood the downsides of poor performance or accidents. For these reasons the full exploitation of Arctic reserves would take a long time to evolve.
This was a fascinating conversation, in which the complexity of Arctic development came through strongly. We could see that the economic opportunities of the region would be the real key to changes in approaches to Arctic management and governance, including in the Arctic Council. Responsibility for environmental change realistically lay elsewhere. But there were powerful incentives for everybody to get the approach right while meeting the best environmental standards. We were all encouraged to see the passion and commitment in the debate and relieved to conclude that there were no looming flashpoints that we could identify. Yet complacency would be out of place: there was a huge amount still to do. Ditchley is grateful for the strength of participants’ contributions to this outcome and in particular to the wisdom and clarity with which our discussion was guided by our two co-chairs. Canadian Ditchley succeeded in producing a significant set of results, which we hope will be carried back to decision-making centres as the opening up of the Arctic proceeds.
This Note reflects the Director’s personal impressions of the conference. No participant is in any way committed to its content or expression.
Mrs Mariot Leslie
HM Diplomatic Service (1977-); Director-General Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (2007-). Formerly: Director, Defence and Strategic Threats; Counter-Terrorism Envoy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (2006-07); Ambassador to Norway (2002-06); Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy, Rome (1998-2001); Head, Policy Planning Staff, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1996-98).
The Honourable Pierre Claude Nolin
Member for De Salaberry, The Senate of Canada (1993-); Vice President, Standing Committee for Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources; Chair (2005-) and Treasurer (2007-), Parliamentary Assembly Reform Working Group; Vice President and Special Rapporteur – Climate Change, Science and Technology Committee (2004-); Deputy Chair, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee; Member (1994-) and Treasurer (2008-), NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
Mr John Richardson
Director, Brussels Forum, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels (2008-). Formerly: Head, Maritime Policy Task Force, European Commission (2005-08); Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the UN, New York (2001-05).
Mr Stephen Browne
Chief Investment Officer, The Independent Order of Foresters (2003-); Director and President, SLJS Financial Management Inc. A Member of the Board of Directors and Treasurer, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Dr Kenneth Coates
Dean, Faculty of Arts, University of Waterloo (2006-); Historian and Author on Northern and Aboriginal Issues. Formerly: Private Consultant, Northern and Aboriginal Issues (2004-06).
Mr Gérald Cossette
Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa.
Ms Cindy Dickson
Director, Circumpolar Relations, and Executive Director (Canada), Arctic Athabaskan Council; Council of Yukon First Nations.
Mr Christian Dubois
Assistant Deputy Minister, Indigenous Affairs Secretariat, Executive Council, Québec (2001-). Formerly: Assistant Deputy Minister, Ministry for Québec and Nord-du-Québec (1997-2001).
Mr Sean Finn
Canadian National Railway (CN) (1994-); Executive Vice-President, Corporate Services, and Chief Legal Officer, CN (2008-). Formerly: Chairman, Board of Directors, Canada and Québec Chamber of Commerce; Mayor of Saint Lambert (Québec) (2006-09).
Professor Louis Fortier
Professor, Biology Department, Université Laval, Québec (1989); Founder, Québec-Océan; Scientific Director, Network of Centres of Excellence ArcticNet; Scientific Leader for the Canadian Research Icebreaker Amundsen; Canada Research Chair on the response of arctic marine ecosystems to climate warming.
Ms Udloriak Hanson
Senior Policy Liaison, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc, Ottawa. Formerly: Executive Director, Qaujisaqtiit Society, Ottawa; Executive Assistant to the Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development, Government of Nunavut, Iqaluit, Nunavut.
Professor Suzanne Lalonde
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal; Project Member, The Law and Politics of Canadian Jurisdiction on Arctic Ocean Seabed, ArcticNet.
Ms Lucie Latulippe
Special Adviser to the Deputy Minister of International Relations, Québec Department of International Relations.
Mr Claude Laverdure
Vice-President and Secretary of The Canadian Ditchley Foundation. Formerly: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs (1965-2007); Ambassador to France (2003-07); Prime Minister’s Personal Representative for the G8 Summit (2002-03).
Mr Pierre Lortie CM
Senior Business Adviser, Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP (2006-). Formerly: President, Transition Committee of the Agglomeration of Montreal (2004-05); President and Chief Operating Officer: Bombardier Transportation (2000-03). President, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
The Honourable Roy MacLaren PC
Formerly: Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (1996-2000); Minister for International Trade (1993-96). A Governor, The Ditchley Foundation.
Mr John McNeil
Director, MMV Financial Inc. Formerly: Director, CP Ships Ltd (2001-06); Chairman, Fairmont Hotels and Resorts Inc (2001-04); Director, Shell Canada (1991-2004). A Member of the Board of Directors, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Mr James Moore
Executive Director, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami.
Mrs Marie-Lucie Morin
National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister of Canada and Associate Secretary to the Cabinet (2008-). Formerly: Deputy Minister of International Trade, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa (2006-08).
The Honourable Dr Paul Okalik
Member of the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut; Chair, Legislative Committee for the Nunavut Assembly.
Mr Robert Sauvé
Deputy Minister, Ministry of Natural Resources and Wildlife, Québec (2009-). Formerly: Assistant Deputy Minister, Regional and Municipal Affairs; Deputy Minister, Ministry for the Regions; Assistant Secretary General, Ministry of Indigenous Affairs.
Mr John Stubbs
Manager, Technical Services, Business Development Group, Fednav Limited, Montreal.
Mr William Turner CM
Chairman and CEO, Exsultate Inc, Montreal; Member, Finance Committee, Carnegie Institution of Washington; Member, British North American Committee; Honorary Consul General of Iceland. Member, Programme Advisory Committee, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Michael Wernick
Deputy Minister, Indian and Northern Affairs, Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada (2006-). Formerly: Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Plans and Consultations, Privy Council Office (2003-06).
Ambassador Thomas Winkler
Under Secretary for Legal Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008-); Associate Professor of International Law, University of Copenhagen. Formerly: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Head, Department of International Law (2004-08); responsible for preparations for Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland (2007).
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT/UNITED KINGDOM
Mr Stewart Arnold
Policy and Communications Adviser to Diana Wallis, MEP, The European Parliament, Brussels.
Ms Diana Wallis MEP
Liberal Democrat Member for Yorkshire and Humber, The European Parliament, Brussels; Vice President of the European Parliament (2007-); European Parliamentary Representative, Nordic Council, Baltic Sea Parliamentarians Conference and Standing Committee of Arctic Parliamentarians; Member (and former President), European Parliamentary Delegation to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
Mr Laurent Mayet
Founding President, Le Cercle Polaire; Special Adviser to Michel Rocard, Ambasssador of France to International Negotiations on the Arctic and the Antarctic (2009-); Co-Author, “Treaty on the Protection of the Arctic Environment” (2008).
Mr Stanislas Pottier
Special Adviser to Michel Rocard, Ambassador of France to International Negotiations on the Arctic and the Antarctic (2009-). Formerly: Special Adviser to the Minister of Economy and Finance (2007-09); Deputy Chief (2005-06) and Chief of Staff (2006-07) to the Trade Minister. Co-founder, Le Cercle Polaire.
Judge Vladimir Golitsyn
Judge, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (2008-); Professor of International Law, Moscow State University of International Relations (2007-). Formerly: United Nations (1982-2007); Director, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2004-07).
Professor Dr Louwrens Hacquebord
Professor of Arctic and Antarctic Studies and Director, The Arctic Centre, University of Groningen; Netherlands Representative, Arctic Monitoring Assessment Programme of the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee.
Dr Harald Brekke
Member, UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) (1997-).
Dr Neil Hamilton
Director, WWF International Arctic Programme. Formerly: Executive Director, Forum for European-Australian Science and Technology Cooperation; Deputy Executive Director, International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, Bonn.
Dr Vladimir Kattsov
Director, Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory, St Petersburg; Member, Joint Scientific Committee of the World Climate Research Programme (2009-); Lead Author Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2005).
Mrs Inna Tarysheva
Second Secretary, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr Anton Vasiliev
Ambassador at Large, Senior Arctic Official of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Formerly: Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in Geneva.
Ambassador Hans Corell
Chairman, Board of Trustees, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University, Sweden. Formerly: Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel, United Nations (1994-2004).
Dr Michael Daly
Head of Exploration and New Business Development, BP, currently sponsoring BP’s work on the Arctic. Formerly: Vice-President, Middle East and South Asia, BP; postings to South America, North Sea and Middle East.
Professor Dougal Goodman
Chief Executive, The Foundation for Science and Technology; Chairman, The Lighthill Risk Network; Visiting Professor, Cranfield University. Formerly: Deputy Director, British Antarctic Survey (1995-2000); BP (1980-95).
Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG
Director, The Ditchley Foundation (2004-); Special Adviser, BP plc (2004-). Formerly: HM Diplomatic Service (1969-2004). Board of Directors, The American Ditchley Foundation. Board of Directors, The Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Mr Martin Hill
Deputy High Commissioner and Counsellor, Economic, Science and Innovation, British High Commission, Ottawa.
Mr Ronald Jamieson
Shell (1973-); Manager Business Development, Shell Shipping Technology, London; Chair, Marine Technical Sub-Committee, Oil Companies International Marine Forum.
Dr Catherine Wills
Art Historian. A Governor and Member of the Council of Management and Programme Committee, The Ditchley Foundation. Board of Directors, The American Ditchley Foundation.
Ms Nina Richardson
Deputy Director, The Ditchley Foundation (2007-).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Honorable John Bellinger III
Partner, Arnold and Porter LLP, Washington DC; Adjunct Senior Fellow in International and Security Law, Council on Foreign Relations. Formerly: Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, US Department of State, Washington DC (2005-09).
Dr John Bockstoce
President, Thalassa Corporation (1987-); Adjunct Curator, New Bedford Whaling Museum (2000-); Vice President, The Hakluyt Society (2002-); Trustee, Center for the Study of the Environment (2006-); Independent Scholar.
Dr David Braaten
Deputy Director, Center for Remote Sensing of Ice Sheets (CReSIS) (2005-); Professor of Atmospheric Science, University of Kansas (1989-); numerous field expeditions to Greenland and Antarctica.
Dr Lawson W Brigham
Professor of Geography and Arctic Policy, University of Alaska Fairbanks (2009-). Formerly: Chair, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment of the Arctic Council (2004-09).
Ms Julie Gourley
Senior Arctic Official, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State.
Ms Marja Verloop
Counselor for Energy, Environment, Science and Technology, US Embassy Ottawa.
Professor Oran Young
Professor, Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions, Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara; Chair, Scientific Steering Committee, International Project on the Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Director, Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College. Author.
Mr Barry Zellen
Research Director, Arctic Security Project, Naval Postgraduate School; Editor, Strategic Insights Journal. Formerly: Publisher, TheSourdough.com (2000-08); Publisher, Cabin Fever (1998-2000); General Manager, Northern Native Broadcasting Yukon (1998-2000). Author.